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THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING ABSOLUTE
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
ON EQUAL PROTECTION GROUNDS
Samantha M. Caspar* & Artem M. Joukov**
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than
any other person in America. His discretion tremendous.... While the
prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our
society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of
the worst.1

The remarkable incarceration rate in the United States (which leads
the world in per capita and absolute terms) has many costs, perhaps none
greater than the imposition of punishment on the innocent by
overzealous prosecutors. We can hope this happens only by chance: that
prosecutors would follow their ethical duty to avoid prosecution where
they see no probable cause or where they find a statute unconstitutional.
This is especially true in the event of an emergency, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, when this hope proves unfounded, as it did
for many during the pandemic, the prosecuted have little recourse
against the prosecutors. This lack of civil remedies denies the innocent
* Samantha M. Caspar is an attorney with the law firm of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP in
Cincinnati, Ohio. She received her Juris Doctor, cum laude, from the University of Alabama School
of Law in 2016. Samantha also earned her Master of Laws in Business Transactions, magna cum
laude, from the University of Alabama School of Law and her Master of Business Administration,
summa cum laude, from the University of Alabama Manderson Graduate School of Business in
2016. She earned her Bachelor of Science in International Business, summa cum laude, with minors
in Economics and Spanish from wright State University in 2012.
** Artem M. Joukov has served as a prosecutor both in Alabama and in Florida. He is
currently a PhD student at the University of Southern California. Artem received his Master of
Business Administration from Florida State University in 2018 and received his Juris Doctor, cum
laude, from the University of Alabama School of Law in 2014. He earned his Bachelor of Science
in Mathematics and History, magna cum laude, with a minor in Philosophy, from
Birmingham-Southern College in 2012.
1. This quote is attributed to Robert H. Jackson, former United States Attorney General,
United States Solicitor General, Associate Supreme Court Justice, and Chief Prosecutor for the
United States of America at the Nuremberg Trials. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3,3 (1940).
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equal protection of the law simply because they had the misfortune of
suffering malicious prosecution due to the misconduct of a prosecuting
attorney rather than the misconduct of anyone else. Given no rational
basis for treating victims of malicious prosecution differently based on
the status of the malicious prosecutor, the absolute immunity judicially
granted to prosecuting attorneys cannot survive equal protection scrutiny
under the U.S. Constitution.
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is an increasing sense that unrestrained prosecutors in the
United States are a problem-"quite possibly the most pressing
challenge in American criminal justice." 2 The issue has received
additional attention during the COVID-19 pandemic, as some
individuals who committed serious crimes were released from jail and
prison (actually encouraging some inmates to infect themselves) while
otherwise innocent citizens suffered prosecution and incarceration for
relatively innocent activities.3 This disparity tended to highlight the

2. David Alan Sklansky, The Problem with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451,
452 (2018).
3. Allison Schaefers, California Honeymooners Arrested for Violating Hawaii Mandatory
Passenger
Quarantine,
STAR
ADVERTISER
(May
1,
2020),
https://www.staradvertiser.com/2020/05/01/breaking-news/califomia-honeymooners-arrested-forviolating-hawaii-mandatory-passenger-quarantine; Kevin Johnson & Richard Wolf, Enforcing the
Shutdown: Law Enforcement Grapples with Policing Stay-at-Home Orders, Social Distancing,
Quarantines, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2020, 2:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
Robert
politics/2020/04/02/coronavirus-police-finesjail-breaking-stay-home-orders/5104704002;
Gearty, 3 Massachusetts Golfers Arrested for Violating Rhode Island Coronavirus Quarantine

Order: Police, FOX NEWS (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/3-massachusetts-golfersarrested-for-violating-rhode-island-coronavirus-quarantine-order-police; Jason Murdock, Florida
Man Breaks QuarantineOrder to Travel Around Hawaii, Is Arrested by Police, NEWSWEEK (Apr.

2, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/florida-man-breaks-hawaii-coronavirus-quarantinearrested-kauai-police-1495672; Lee Brown, SWAT Team Arrests Armed 'Vigilantes' Defying
Lockdown in Texas Bar, N.Y. POST (May 6, 2020, 10:49 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/05/06/swatteam-arrests-armed-vigilantes-helping-bar-defy-lockdown; David K. Li, DallasSalon Owner Gets 7
Days in Jail for Reopening During CoronavirusLockdown, NBC NEWS (May 6, 2020, 1:11 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dallas-salon-owner-gets-7-daysjail-reopening-duringcoronavirus-n1200836; Fletcher Page, Hamilton County ProsecutorJoe Deters on Stay-at-Home
Violators: 'Sit Your Butt in a Jail,' FOx19 NOW (Apr. 5, 2020, 12:23 PM),
https://www.fox l9.com/2020/04/05/hamilton-county-prosecutor-joe-deters-stay-at-home-violatorssit-your-butt-jail; Cameron Knight, Deters Hopes Felony Charge and High Bond for Corona-Order
Violator Sets Example, CINCINNATI.COM (Apr. 6, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/

story/news/2020/04/06/deters-hopes-felony-charge-and-high-bond-corona-order-violator-setsexample/2954955001; Sharon Coolidge, Court Filing: Man in OTR Gathering Video Punished
More Harshly Because He's Black, CINCINNATICOM (Apr. 14, 2020, 12:32 PM),
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2020/04/14/court-filing-black-man-violating-stay-homeorder-punished-unfairly/2982831001; Dominick Mastrangelo, 'Sit Your Butt in a Jail': Ohio
ProsecutorHas 'No Patiencefor' Violators of Stay-at-Home Order, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 5,
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complaints that prosecutors were overly zealous, though other news
demonstrated that failure to prosecute could be equally problematic. As
the pandemic raged through America, the shooting of Ahmaud Arbery
came to light, showing two (and perhaps three) white men in a truck
chasing a Black jogger and executing him.4 What stunned citizens is that
PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/sit-your-butt-in-a-jail-ohio12:30
2020,
prosecutor-has-no-patience-for-violators-of-stay-at-home-order; Scott Morefield, Ohio Prosecutor
to Stay-At-Home Violators: 'You Can Sit There and Kill Yourself' in Jail, DAILY CALLER (Apr. 5,
2020, 3:42 PM), https://dailycaller.com/2020/04/05/ohio-prosecutor-joe-deters-stay-at-home-killyourself-violators-coronavirus; John Eligon, 'It'sa Slap in the Face': Victims Are Angered as Jails
Free Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/coronavirus-

jail-inmates-released.html; Ernesto Londoho et al., As Coronavirus Strikes Prisons, Hundreds of
Thousands Are Released, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/
26/world/americas/coronavirus-brazil-prisons.html; Timothy Bella, Inmates Tried to Infect
Themselves with the Coronavirus to Get Early Release, Los Angeles County Sheriff Says, WASH.

POST (May 12, 2020, 5:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/12/inmatescoronavirus-infect-los-angeles; Nick Givas, Over 16K US Inmates Have Been Released as
Coronavirus Crisis Has Progressed, Fox NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/
Katelyn Newman, For Prisoners
here-is-how-many-prisoners-have-been-released-covid-19;
Released Due to COVID-19, a Different World Awaits, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 15, 2020, 10:13 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2020-04-15/prisoners-released-dueto-coronavirus-enter-a-different-world; Jonathan Choe, PrisonersReleasedfrom Facilitiesto Limit
COVID-19 Spread Arrested Again for Crimes, KOMO NEWS (May 8, 2020),

https://komonews.com/news/coronavirus/prisoners-released-from-facilities-to-limit-covid- 9spread-arrested-again-for-crimes; Marisa Kendall & Robert Salonga, Coronavirus: Mass Jail,
Prison Releases Leave Some Bay Area Inmates on the Streets, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020,

2:54 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/04/27/coronavirus-mass-jail-prison-releases-leavesome-inmates-on-the-streets; Emily Hoerner, Hundreds of Illinois PrisonersReleased as COVID-19
Spreads, but Few Elderly See
Reprieve, INJUSTICEWATCH
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/prisons-and-jails/2020/hundreds-of-illinois-prisonersreleased-as-covid- 1 9-spreads-but-few-elderly-see-reprieve.
4. Coronavirus: A Timeline of How the Deadly COVID-19 Outbreak Is Evolving, PHARM.
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/news/coronavirus-a-timeline-of-how-theTECH.,
deadly-outbreak-evolved (last visited Feb. 8, 2021); Caroline Kantis et al., Updated: Timeline of the
Coronavirus, THINK GLOB. HEALTH, https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/updated-timeline-

&

coronavirus (last visited Feb. 8, 2021); Dakin Andone et al., Georgia Attorney GeneralRequests
DOJInvestigation into the Handling of the Ahmaud Arbery Case, CNN (May 11, 2020, 10:04 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/10/us/ahmaud-arbery-surveillance-video/index.html; Susan Miller
Grace Hauck, Additional Video Shows GeorgiaJogger Ahmaud Arbery Did Nothing Illegal Before
Being Killed, Attorneys Say,
USA
TODAY
(May
10,
2020,
8:04
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/1 0/ahmaud-arbery-shooting-new-videoshows-georgia-jogger-did-nothing-illegal/3105123001; Anne Schindler & Troy Kless, New Video in
Ahmaud Arbery Case Offers a View of What HappenedMoments Before the Deadly Shooting, FIRST

COAST NEWS (May 10, 2020, 3:43 PM), https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/crime/videoshows-person-in-vacant-home-in-ahmaud-arbery-case/77-990e647b-3493-49ab-88ec3a3d517bl9ed; Cleve R. Wootson, Jr. & Colby Itkowitz, New Video Said to Show Moments
Leading up to Georgia Jogger Ahmaud Arbery's Death, WASH. POST (May 10, 2020, 11:01 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/09/georgia-attomey-general-investigate-localofficials-handling-ahmaud-arberys-murder; Natasha Lennard, The Perversity of Needing to See
Ahmaud Arbery Die on Video to Recognize that His Black Life Mattered, INTERCEPT (May 9, 2020,

7:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/09/ahmaud-arbery-video; Khushbu Shah, 'Every Stone
Will be Uncovered': How Georgia Officials Failedthe Ahmaud Arbery Case, GUARDIAN (May 9,
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the video depicted a clear homicide, while the men involved, having
connections to the prosecutor's office in the county in which the crime
was committed, escaped indictment for months and were not placed
under arrest until video of the crime became public.5 Additionally, early
May 2020 saw the dismissal of charges against General Michael Flynn. 6
The Justice Department, under a new Attorney General, determined that
Flynn's prosecution was an error of judgment and that the actions of the
prosecutors and investigators were subject to far more scrutiny than the
actions of the defendant.7 Flynn's case drew ire from prosecutorial
critics on both sides: some claiming Flynn should have been prosecuted
to the full extent of the law while others claiming his case was a sign of
prosecutorial and investigative misconduct.'
These events naturally raised general questions of whether
prosecutors were acting properly and whether their misdeeds and the
misconduct of law enforcement should be tolerated by society.9
Combined with national news of severe crackdowns on small business

AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/09/every-stone-will-be2020,
8:03
Brakkton Booker, More Arrests
uncovered-how-georgia-officials-failed-the-ahmaud-arbery-case;
Possible in the Killing ofAhmaud Arbery, Georgia Investigators Say, NPR (May 8, 2020, 4:49 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/08/852719660/more-arrests-possible-in-the-killing-of-ahmaud-arberystate-investigators-say; Brie Stimson, Ahmaud Arbery Case: Additional Video Being Reviewed,
Authorities Say, Fox NEWS (May 10, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/ahmaud-arbery-caseadditional-video-being-reviewed-authorities-say.
5. Andone et al., supra note 4; Miller & Hauck, supra note 4; Schindler & Kless, supra note
4; Wootson & Itkowitz, supra note 4; Lennard, supra note 4; Shah, supra note 4; Booker, supra
note 4; Stimson, supra note 4.
6.

Tim Hains, Devin Nunes: "We Can't Find"FBI's Original Michael Flynn Interview 302

Report;
"It's
Gone,
Poof,"
REALCLEARPOLITICS
(May
10,
2020),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/05/10/devin_nunes_we_cant_find_original-michael_
flynninterview_smmary_its-gonepoof.html; Katelyn Polantz, Justice Department Drops
Criminal
Case
Against
Michael
Flynn,
CNN:
POL.,
(May 7, 2020, 7:47
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/07/politics/michael-flynn-prosecution/index.htm
PM); Danny Cevallos, Defense Lawyers Rail About Unfair Prosecutions. Flynn's Case Shows Why.,

&

4:09 PM),
https://www.nbenews.com/politics/justiceNBC NEWS
(May 9, 2020,
Eric
department/defense-lawyers-rail-about-unfair-prosecutions-flynn-s-case-shows-n 1203781;
Tucker & Michael Balsamo, Flynn Dismissal a Surprise? AG Barr in Sync with Trump,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/aelad252bbl3490db2ceffc5dl7b6d92;
Aruna viswanatha & Sadie Gurman, Justice Department to Drop Case Against Michael Flynn,
WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2020, 10:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-to-dropcase-against-mike-flynn-11588878267.
7. Hains, supra note 6; Polantz, supra note 6; Cevallos, supra note 6; Tucker & Balsamo,
supra note 6; viswanatha & Gurman, supra note 6.
8. Hains, supra note 6; Polantz, supra note 6; Cevallos, supra note 6; Tucker & Balsamo,
supra note 6; Viswanatha & Gurman, supra note 6.
9. Hains, supra note 6; Polantz, supra note 6; Cevallos, supra note 6; Tucker & Balsamo,
supra note 6; Viswanatha & Gurman, supra note 6; see also Andone et al., supra note 4; Miller
Hauck, supra note 4; Schindler & Kless, supra note 4; Wootson & Itkowitz, supra note 4; Lennard,
supra note 4; Shah, supra note 4; Booker, supra note 4; Stimson, supra note 4.
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operations based on somewhat arbitrary classifications of essential
versus nonessential businesses, many questioned the roles of prosecutors
and members of law enforcement, accusing them of using the crisis to
seize power. 10 This discussion of prosecutors seizing more and more
power has been in the background of legal thought in the United States
for at least the past several decades."
The additional national attention given to prosecutorial misconduct
during the COVID-19 pandemic offers us an opportunity to reexamine
the issue and suggest future empirical studies once the data concerning
illegal prosecutions during the pandemic becomes available.12
Specifically, we can use an unprecedented shock that leads to wrongful
arrests and wrongful prosecutions. Then, we can track the civil
recoveries obtained from the former as a proxy for the damages the
prosecutors caused in the latter. An approach like this could help
quantify the harm wrongful prosecutions cause and help answer an
empirical question of whether malicious prosecution draws too little or
too much attention from the public and politicians.
Moreover, this Article will also highlight the problems with current
prosecutorial oversight in general, demonstrating that legal rules
granting prosecutors immunity for their prosecutorial acts encourage
misconduct and should be abandoned to prevent the misconduct
highlighted in the COVID-19 response from occurring again in any
context. Legal scholars often point the finger at prosecutors for
congested prisons and racially disproportionate justice. 3 Activists fault
prosecutors for protecting violent law enforcement officers.1 4 The issue
of prosecutors protecting violent law enforcement officers was a major
issue in the case of Ahmaud Arbery, where prosecutors (at best) dragged
their feet or (at worst) showed their will to look the other way when a
former investigator with the office took part in the brutal slaying of a

10. See Schaefers, supra note 3; Johnson & Wolf, supra note 3; Gearty, supra note 3;
Murdock, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 3; Li, supra note 3; Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra

note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supranote 3; Morefield, supra note 3.
11. Comment, Briggs v. Goodwin: Callingfor Reappraisalof ProsecutorialImmunity from
Constitutional Torts, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 385-86, 391-93 (1977) [hereinafter Briggs v.
Goodwin].
12. See Schaefers, supra note 3; Johnson & Wolf, supra note 3; Gearty, supra note 3;
Murdock, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 3; Li, supra note 3; Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra
note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supranote 3; Morefield, supra note 3.
13. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION - AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE
REAL
REFORM
5-7
(2017);
Racial
Disparity,
SENT'G
PROJECT,

https://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/racial-disparity (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
14.

Taylor Pendergrass, How Bad Prosecutors Cause Bad Policing, SLATE (Aug. 16, 2016,

2:09
PM),
policing.html.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/08/how-bad-prosecutors-cause-bad-
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young Black jogger under the likely false pretense of a citizen's arrest.' 5
On the other hand, prosecutors sometimes engage in overzealous
prosecution of socially or politically unpopular defendants. This was
apparently the case with General Michael Flynn.' 6 Less politicized
problems may include procedural steps such as denying defense counsel
access to discovery despite legal provisions to the contrary, making the
defense of a potentially innocent defendant all the more difficult.
At least one federal appellate judge has stated that prosecutors often
do not fully comply with their requirement to disclose exculpatory
evidence in their possession to the defense.' 7 Many former prosecutors
grow critical of the profession," though there are members of the
profession who still remain faithful to their oaths. 19 So far, despite all of
the complaints, there is no reasonable recourse provided to those
individuals targeted by unscrupulous prosecutors. A large, seemingly
insurmountable barrier stands in the way of holding prosecutors
responsible: the concept of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 20 This
court-imposed doctrine holds that no matter how egregious his or her
judicial acts are, the prosecutor can face no liability for them. 21 Many
scholars have addressed potential problems with absolute prosecutorial
immunity. 22 The wisdom of granting prosecutors full protections from
suit when some have abused the privilege seems contrary to a common
law concept dating back to the Magna Carta: that no one is above the
law.23 Yet, despite scholarly support for removing this bar to recovery, 2 4
the totality of the arguments remains incomplete.
15. See Andone et al., supra note 4; Miller & Hauck, supranote 4; Schindler & Kless, supra
note 4; wootson & Itkowitz, supra note 4; Lennard, supra note 4; Shah, supra note 4; Booker,
supra note 4; Stimson, supranote 4.

16. Hains, supra note 6; Polantz, supra note 6; Cevallos, supra note 6; Tucker & Balsamo,
supra note 6; Viswanatha & Gurman, supranote 6.
17. Hon. Alex Kozinski, CriminalLaw 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxii-xxvi
(2015).
18. Sklansky, supra note 2, at 452-53.
19. To fault all prosecutors is a mistake. Rather, we should endeavor sorting out the wheat
from the chaff, holding those who engage in prosecutorial misconduct responsible while applauding
those who resist the urge to abuse their power.
20. See Briggs v. Goodwin, supra note 11, at 376; Mark Niles, A New Balance of Evils:
ProsecutorialMisconduct, Iqbal, and the End of Absolute Immunity, 13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 137,

167 (2017); Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
ProsecutorialImmunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 509, 516-20 (2011).
21. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
22. See Briggs v. Goodwin, supra note 11, at 391-92; Niles, supra note 20, at 169-72; Johns,
supra note 20, at 516-21.
23. Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-

carta-muse-and-mentor/executive-power.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
24. See Briggs v. Goodwin, supra note 11; Niles, supra note 20, at 169-72; Johns, supra note
20, at 516-21.
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It appears that advocates against absolute immunity leave
unaddressed whether this policy can withstand equal protection
scrutiny.25 This question should flow naturally from the nature of
prosecutorial immunity since this judicially-created rule treats
individuals maliciously prosecuted by a prosecutor differently than those
maliciously prosecuted by anyone else. 26 By doing so, the rule protects
one class of people by allowing them civil remedies while denying
another class the same protection. 27 In many instances, the application of
this rule does so as a result of no action by the victim: since a malicious
prosecution or a civil rights violation by governing authorities arises
from no misconduct by the accused, he or she cannot truly control
whether the perpetrator of the malicious action is a prosecutor or
someone else.
Some might argue that prosecutorial immunity, having been created
by the courts, should inherently withstand an equal protection challenge.
After all, if allowing prosecutors to invoke absolute immunity implied
an equal protection violation, then courts would not have permitted it.
However, courts have an evolving standard with respect to equal
protection itself, and as recent cases have demonstrated, that which
passed constitutional muster in the 1970s no longer satisfies equal
protection principles. 28 Curiously, it was in the 1970s that the United
States Supreme Court recognized the absolute immunity doctrine as
applied to prosecutors. 29 Given the passage of time and the lessons it
brings, perhaps judges and justices across the United States should
consider giving the absolute immunity doctrine a second, more skeptical
look.
Part II of this Article will outline the concepts and application of
prosecutorial immunity. 30 Part III will note some particularly egregious
prosecutorial violations that absolute immunity has shielded from
prosecution, and Part IV will discuss the implications of such
25. See, e.g., Bidish Sarma, Private: After 40 Years, Is It Time to Reconsider Absolute
Immunity for Prosecutors?,

AM.

CONST.

SOC'Y

(July

19, 2016),

https://www.acslaw.org/

expertforum/after-40-years-is-it-time-to-reconsider-absolute-immunity-for-prosecutors.
26.

See Malicious Prosecution - Other Considerations, LAW LIBR.: AM. L. & LEGAL INFO.,

https://law.jrank.org/pages/8405/Malicious-Prosecution-Other-Considerations.html (last visited Feb.
8, 2021).
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (finding no constitutional question in
a challenge to a state prohibition of same-sex marriage); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744,
775 (2013) (striking down a federal definition of marriage which excluded same-sex couples on
constitutional grounds); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (explicitly reversing
Baker).
29. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
30.

See infra Part II.
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prosecutorial misconduct.3 1 In Part V, this Article will demonstrate that
allowing victims of malicious prosecution to recover should be
mandated under the equal protection principles outlined in the U.S.
Constitution.32 This Article concludes that permitting recovery against
prosecutors under qualified rather than absolute immunity would
properly expand the rights of victims and may help remedy the problem
altogether.33 Hence, the current absolute immunity doctrine should be set
aside both as a result of constitutional mandate and as a matter of sound

policy.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY

When government officers are sued in an individual capacity for
monetary damages, they generally have either absolute or qualified
immunity. 34 The United States Supreme Court has stated that qualified
35
immunity is the default, and absolute immunity is the exception. The
immunity this Article targets is the one extended to prosecutors
performing their prosecutorial duties. However, before explaining why
this immunity should be abolished under equal protection principles, this
Article should note the reason for its adoption in the first place.
A.

Overview ofAbsolute Immunity

Absolute immunity protects a prosecutor from lawsuits arising out
of injuries caused by the prosecutor's own misconduct within the scope
36
For
of prosecutorial duties, even if the misconduct was willful.
exculpatory
instance, if a prosecutor deliberately withholds significant
evidence in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the American Bar
Association ("ABA") Model Rules, causing an innocent person to spend
decades in prison, the prosecutor remains immune from civil liability
37
regardless of the defendant's future exoneration. The United States
31. See infra Part III; Part IV.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra Part V.
34. Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and Recent Developments,
24 TOuRO L. REv. 473, 473 (2014).
35. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 810-11 (1982)).
Soc'Y
(Jan. 4, 2018, 2:00 PM),
36. Prosecutorial Immunity, FEDERALIST
https://fedsoc.org/events/prosecutorial-immunity; Briggs v. Goodwin, supranote 11, at 386; Niles,
supra note 20, at 147; Johns, supra note 20, at 521 ("When acting as advocates, prosecutors receive
absolute immunity even when they have acted intentionally and maliciously."); Kate McClelland,
Comment,

"Somebody Help Me Understand This": The Supreme Court's Interpretation of

ProsecutorialImmunity and Liability Under § 1983, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1323, 1331
(2012).
37. ProsecutorialImmunity, supra note 36.
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Supreme Court has approved absolute immunity in five contexts: for
prosecutors performing prosecutorial acts (but not investigative or
administrative tasks),38 judges performing judicial tasks (but not
administrative tasks), 39 legislators performing legislative tasks, 40 police
officers who testify as witnesses (covering their testimony but not the
actual investigation of the defendant), 4 and the President of the United
States for certain acts while in office.4 2
Despite the serious consequences that can result from a
prosecutor's misconduct, prosecutors are largely shielded from any
liability that may result from their actions due to the 1976 United States
Supreme Court ruling in Imbler v. Pachtman43 granting them absolute
immunity. Some scholars argue that this grant of immunity resulted in
an era of mass incarceration and "eroded one of the few mechanisms
available to hold prosecutors accountable." 44 In Imbler, a prosecutor
knowingly used false testimony, causing an innocent person to be
convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison. 45 The individual sued
the prosecutor for monetary damages upon release, but the Court held
that prosecutors are generally entitled to absolute immunity from any
civil liability under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for
any actions taken in their role as prosecutors that may have violated a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights.4 6
Equally unsettling is the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Burns v. Reed. 47 In this case, a woman awoke one night to learn her two
sons had been shot. 48 The police had no suspects so they instead focused
on the mother, Cathy Bums. 49 After the shooting, Burns discovered a
note in the bathroom, written in lipstick, which stated, "I took what you

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 220-21 (1988).
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998).
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983).
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).

43. 424 U.S. at 427-29; see also Matt Ferner, ProsecutorsAre Almost Never Disciplinedfor
Misconduct, HUFFPOST (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:16 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/prosecutor-

misconduct-justice_n_56be0ofe4bc3c55050748a
("Prosecutors are rarely punished for
misconduct, and the cases that have led to disbarment or even criminal charges are few and far
between. When prosecutors do face severe consequences for breaking the law, it's when their
behavior is deemed to be deliberate and seemingly indefensible. At the same time, their punishment
may not be proportional to the damage they have inflicted upon innocent people, which illustrates
the considerable latitude the legal process affords to prosecutors.").
44.

Sarma, supra note 25.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 414-16; Chemerinsky, supra note 34, at 477.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415-16.
500 U.S. 478 (1991).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 481-82.
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loved most." 5 0 A left-handed person likely wrote the note, but Burns was
right-handed. 5 ' Burns also passed a lie detector test and a voice stress
test.5 2 An officer believed that Burns had multiple personality disorder
and that one of her alternative personalities committed the crime.53 The
officer called Rick Reed, the local prosecutor, to obtain permission to
hypnotize Burns to determine whether she suffered from multiple
personality disorder.54 The police officer hired a friend who had just
completed a course in hypnosis (and was a grocery store clerk at the
time) to perform the analysis, and while under hypnosis, Burns referred
5
Based on this
to herself by another name in the third person.
disclosure, the officer concluded Burns suffered from multiple
56
The
personality disorder and obtained a warrant for her arrest.
the
in
was
used
hypnosis
prosecutor failed to disclose to the judge that
57
case, and as a result, Burns lost her job and custody of her child. She
was ultimately exonerated, as there was no evidence connecting her to
the crimes, and she sued the prosecutor. 58 However, the United States
Supreme Court once again held the prosecutor had absolute immunity
for his prosecutorial act of requesting the arrest warrant and prosecuting
the case in court.59
These cases make one thing clear: a defendant wrongfully accused
by a prosecutor cannot find relief in the form of civil monetary
damages.60 Under absolute prosecutorial immunity, it is theoretically
possible for a prosecutor to draft an information or indictment charging
an individual with capital murder, without any evidence or even an
arrest, and avoid having to pay damages. The prosecutor would likely
suffer severe scrutiny at the hand of his or her supervisors and perhaps
even lose his or her license to practice law. However, to the individual
charged with a serious crime completely out of the blue without any
connection thereto, recovery would be unavailable. The existence of this
theoretical possibility alone should be argument enough against an

50. Burns v. Reed, 894 F.2d 949, 950 (7th Cir. 1990).
51. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 482; Chemerinsky, supra note 34, at 478.
52. Burns, 500 U.S. at 481-82.
53. Id. at 482.
54. Id.
55. Burns, 894 F.2d at 951; Burns, 500 U.S. at 482.
56. Burns, 500 U.S. at 482.
57. Id. at 482-83, 482 n.1.
58. Id. at 483.
59. Id. at 487.
60. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976) (describing how absolute immunity
leaves the wronged criminal defendant without civil redress).
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absolute bar to recovery. Making the privilege less absolute might be a
possible remedy.
B.

Overview of QualifiedImmunity

Qualified immunity is a doctrine related to absolute immunity that
protects government officials from liability, but only if "their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."61 Simply, qualified
immunity protects government officials who follow the rules, whereas
absolute immunity protects government officials from liability even
when they break the rules.62 Qualified immunity only applies to lawsuits
against government officials as individuals, not lawsuits against the
government for damages caused by the officials' actions. 63 Although
qualified immunity often appears in cases involving police officers, it
also applies to most other executive branch officials." This Article will
argue that this level of immunity is more appropriate for prosecutors.
III.

PROSECUTORS

While most people are at least vaguely aware of the job the average
prosecutor might do, many would be surprised to learn just how little
recourse there is to being falsely accused by one of these public
servants.65 One might suspect that a prosecutor falsely accusing a citizen
of a felony would be punished harshly (if not civilly, then at least
ethically), given the harm that this would do to the citizen. 66 The reality
proves murkier, since intentional violations are difficult to prove, and
most monitoring bodies are unlikely to be particularly interested in doing
the work to prove them. 67 After all, pursuing a prosecutor on behalf of
the accused (who may or may not have several prior convictions)
68
probably ranks low on the priority lists of most ethics monitors. For
61. Harlqw v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
62.
63.

Sarma, supra note 25.
Qualified Immunity,

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
INST.,
INFO.
LEGAL
qualified immunity (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
64. Id.
65. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (stating that "this [absolute] immunity does leave the genuinely
wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action
deprives him of liberty").
66. GTCadmin, The Impact of a Felony Conviction, HALSCOTT MEGARO (May 8, 2018),
https://www.appealslawgroup.com/the-impact-of-a-felony-conviction.
67. Emma Zack, Why Holding ProsecutorsAccountable Is So Difficult, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.innocenceproject.org/why-holding-prosecutors-accountable-is-sodifficult.
68. Id.
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this reason, this Article will underscore just how many duties a
prosecutor engages in as part of his or her profession to demonstrate just
how many opportunities he or she has to inconvenience the average
citizen, all while receiving absolute immunity due to the judicial nature
of these acts.
A.

Introduction

Prosecutors in the United States are the attorneys who charge
defendants with crimes-the intermediaries between the police and the
judiciary. 69 Prosecutors determine which offenses should be charged and
against whom, and they present the cases in court. 70 In a criminal case
brought pursuant to state law-the significant majority of criminal cases
in the United States-the prosecutor generally works for a county-level
office, run by an elected official commonly known as a district attorney
or state attorney.7 1 Federal prosecutors typically work in an office
overseen by a United States Attorney, who is appointed by the
President. 72
Working as a prosecutor has long been a gateway to other
prestigious jobs, such as judgeships, other elected offices, and senior

positions in law firms. 73 Research suggests, perhaps not surprisingly,
that the majority of prosecutors are primarily motivated by career
considerations, which have often been thought to drive prosecutors to
engage in unethical behavior. 74 When prosecutors obtain convictions,
they are subject to several powerful incentives, including favorable
media coverage, career promotions, appointment to judgeships, and the
ability to run for political office. 75 A study demonstrated that obtaining
longer sentences helps prosecutors secure other prestigious jobs when
they leave their prosecutorial office. 76 Prosecutors are also sometimes
motivated by "prosecutorial passion"-a desire to pursue justice,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Sklansky, supranote 2, at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 453.
&

74. Id.; Michael Tonry, Prosecutorsand Politics: A ComparativePerspective, 41 CRIME
JUST. 1, 27-28 (2012).
75. An Epidemic of Prosecutor Misconduct, CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY,

http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/EpidemicofProsecutorMisconduct.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 8, 2021); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 453.
76. Richard T. Boylan, What Do ProsecutorsMaximize? Evidencefrom the Careers of U.S.
Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 379, 385 (2005); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 453.
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"framed by prosecutors' self-image 'as warriors in a fight between the
good and the guilty."' 7 7
B.

Power

Prosecutors in the United States are more than just representatives
state: top prosecutors in every county "typically have to run for
the
of
the office, making them elected officials as well."7 8 Few nations elect
their prosecutors, and few give them as much power as they wield in the
United States. 79 American prosecutors have extremely broad discretion
over how and when to prosecute their cases, meaning they often
single-handedly control defendants' fates, and "prosecutors are
increasingly blamed for the problems that plague U.S. criminal justiceits excessive severity, its lopsided targeting of racial minorities, and its
propensity for error." 80
Part of the issue is, according to Stanford Law School Professor
David Alan Sklansky, because "the checks on [prosecutor's] actions are
relatively weak." 8 1 Prosecutors are commonly described as the "most
powerful figures in the criminal justice system," and there are more than
2,300 prosecutors across the nation. 82 Prosecutors have "complete and
unrivaled access to evidence that can determine a person's guilt or
innocence."8 3 Former United States Attorney General Robert Jackson
explained the prosecutor's essentially unrestrained power as follows:
[A prosecutor] can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of
person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and
veiled or unveiled intimations.. . . The prosecutor can order arrests,
present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the basis of his
one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be indicted
and held for trial. He may then dismiss the case before trial, in which
case the defense never has a chance to be heard. Or he may go on with
a public trial. If he obtains a conviction, the prosecutor can still make
recommendations as to sentence, as to whether the prisoner should get

77. Sklansky, supra note 2, at 453 (quoting Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion,
Cognitive Bias, andPlea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REv. 183, 187-88(2007)).
78. Jessica Brown, If It Pleases the Prosecution, KNOWABLE MAG., May 22, 2019,
https://knowablemagazine.org/article/society/2019/if-it-pleases-prosecution.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Sklansky, supra note 2, at 459.
82. Sklansky, supranote 2, at 453; Ferner, supra note 43.
83. Ferner, supra note 43.
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probation or a suspended sentence, and after [the individual] is put
away, as to whether [the individual] is a fit subject for parole.

Prosecutorial power has continued to increase since Jackson's
speech in the 1940s. 85 The majority of criminal cases are resolved by
plea bargains rather than trials, and the number of criminal charges
imposing mandatory prison terms has increased. 86 Prosecutors also
exercise immense power over criminal justice policies and strategies. 87
They often lobby for or against criminal justice legislation, exercising
significant influence on the passage of laws they would later enforce. 88
When asked about why prosecutors do not use their powers more fairly,
Professor Sklansky stated that "too often, convictions and long sentences
get celebrated [by prosecutors], even if they are undeserved." 89 He
elaborated further on how and why prosecutors abuse their power:
Prosecutors have vastly more investigative resources at their disposal
than defense attorneys, so they often have more access to information
and evidence. Prosecutors are required to share evidence with the
defense only if it could help the defendant in [a] significant way. But
because they're so motivated to win, it can be very hard for
prosecutors to objectively decide whether the evidence they've
uncovered is worth sharing. They have an incentive to convince
themselves it isn't.90

C.

Discretion

Prosecutorial power and discretion are closely related, albeit they
contain important differences. Power is defined as the ability to do
something, such as impose consequences on an individual or influence
an individual's actions. 91 Discretion is defined as the freedom to decide
whether to impose such consequences or influence an individual's
actions. 92 American prosecutors have extremely broad discretion
regarding how and when to exercise their prosecutorial authority, which

84. Jackson, supranote 1, at 3.
85. See Sklansky, supra note 2, at 453-54.
86. See id.; see also Paige A. Nutini, What PractitionersShould Know About Navigating the
Prosecutor's "Trial Tax," A.B.A (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/commercial-business/practice/2019/operation-varsity-blues-plea-deals-trial-tax.
87. See Sklansky, supra note 2, at 454.
88. Id.
89. Brown, supra note 78.
90. Id.
91. Sklansky, supra note 2, at 456.
92. See id.
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strengthens their prosecutorial power. 93 This discretion extends to
deciding which criminal cases to pursue, which crimes to charge in each
case, and which charges to bargain away in exchange for a guilty plea. 94
Criminal statutes essentially function as "a menu from which the
prosecutor may order as she wishes." 95 Because potential penalties under
many criminal statutes are severe, prosecutors' "discretion to invoke
these statutes or to take them off the table gives [them] great bargaining
leverage, increasing [the prosecutor's] power." 96 Even charges that carry
with them mandatory minimums for conviction may be circumvented by
prosecutors as part of a guilty plea by simply waiving the mandatory
minimum. Even if this might be contrary to the intent of the criminal
statute, there is usually no one to raise the objection: the defendant, who
is avoiding serving the mandatory minimum sentence, will certainly
remain silent. Sklansky explains:
Prosecutors have no legal obligation to file charges that they believe
are proportionate to the defendant's culpability, nor is there any legal
limit on the "discounts" prosecutors can offer in exchange for a
defendant's guilty plea-or, viewed another way, the penalty
97
prosecutors can impose for a defendant's insistence on going to trial.

The practice of imposing a greater sentence upon conviction after a trial
is often referred to as the "trial tax." 98
Prosecutors' immense discretion has been deemed problematic
because of the power it places in the hands of a single individual who
can rarely be held accountable for negligent mistakes or outright willful
malice. 99 This discretion increases prosecutorial power, which is already
excessive.1 00 Such discretion also undermines the predictability of
decision-making. 101
in arbitrary
resulting
sanctions,
criminal
Prosecutorial discretion further causes racial bias and other forms of
discrimination, since even well-meaning prosecutors may suffer from
some forms of unconscious bias.102 Evidence exists that part of the racial
disparity in the criminal justice system arises from the ability to exercise
prosecutorial discretion.10 3
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nutini, supra note 86.
Sklansky, supra note 2, at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Misconduct

There are many examples of prosecutorial misconduct, which are
sufficiently numerous to avoid listing here. 104 However, this Article
should include at least a few examples to demonstrate these are not
merely harmless errors. In one unfortunate case, a man stood accused of
stealing a laptop, but the prosecutor had a secret DNA report proving
that a different man was responsible. 105 Regardless, the prosecutor
withheld the report from the defense while the defendant received a
wrongful conviction and served one year in jail. 106 We are aware of no
way in which the prosecutor's office has compensated the defendant for
the loss of liberty (which essentially resulted in false imprisonment), his
lost wages, his mental and physical anguish, and the reputational harm.
Clever plaintiff's lawyers could probably add other damages to this list.
In another case (with higher stakes), a defendant was convicted of
murder, yet prosecutors never mentioned, neither during the proceedings
nor during the discovery stage, that someone else confessed to the
crime.'0 7 The confession was eventually discovered, and after nearly
fourteen years in prison, the man was released.1 08 Likewise, Anthony
Graves, a twenty-six-year-old Black man in Texas, was wrongfully
convicted of murdering a family of six in 1994.109 He spent eighteen
years of his life in prison, including twelve years on death row."0
Eventually, the real murderer, Robert Carter, confessed that he had acted
alone."' Investigations proved that the prosecutor, Charles Sebesta,
withheld testimony that would have cleared Graves." 2 To our
knowledge, this defendant also received no restitution or other
compensation from the prosecutors who ruined his life and whose
actions resulted in his false imprisonment for years. Under the absolute

immunity doctrine, none can be expected." 3

104.

How Common Is Prosecutorial Misconduct?, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 3, 2007),

https://www.innocenceproject.org/how-common-is-prosecutorial-misconduct.
105. Jeff Adachi & Peter Calloway, One Simple Way to Hold Bad Prosecutors Accountable,
APPEAL (Mar. 21, 2019), https://theappeal.org/prosecutorial-misconduct-jeff-adachi-commentary.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brown, supra note 78.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Briggs v. Goodwin, supra note 11, at 386; Niles, supra note 20, at 168; Johns, supra note
20, at 534; McClelland, supra note 36, at 1343; Chemerinsky, supra note 34, at 494; Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
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1. Prosecutorial Overreach During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Unfortunately, the above cases are not outliers." 4 Rather, they are
part of a serious epidemic of prosecutorial misconduct that plagues
American courts, seriously undermining the rights of persons accused of
crimes and increasing America's epidemic of overcrowding in jails and
prisons." 5 Recently, the United States has been struck by another
epidemic: COVID-19. This exogenous shock actually provides an
interesting opportunity to study phenomena such as prosecutorial
misconduct due to the expansion of laws permitting the prosecution of
mostly harmless acts across the United States and the differences among
these laws across the country.116 While we will not be able to gather this
data as of the writing of this Article, we are confident that data will
emerge of prosecutors (and law enforcement) acting well outside of their
authority given the risks of the virus.1 1 7 However, as this Article will
make clear, only the law enforcement officers can be sued for such
misconduct. 18 If prosecutors follow through with charges after a
wrongful arrest by law enforcement, it may imply similar or greater
misconduct by prosecutors than their compatriots in law enforcement.
Some of this prosecutorial misconduct has already become apparent
in certain places across the United States.' 19 With governors issuing
stay-at-home orders to curb the spread of COVID-19, prosecutors found
at their disposal both popular support and the apparent legal authority to
hold people responsible for conduct that used to be quite legal: simply
going outside the home and enjoying a walk in the park.120 Ordinarily,
restrictions limiting citizens' access to streets, public parks, roads, and

114. Adachi & Calloway, supranote 105.
115. Id.
116. See Schaefers, supra note 3; Johnson & Wolf, supra note 3; Gearty, supra note 3;
Murdock, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 3; Li, supra note 3; Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra
note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note 3; Morefield, supra note 3.
117. Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note
3; Morefield, supra note 3.
118. Frederic Block, Let's Put an End to ProsecutorialImmunity, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar.

13, 2018, 10:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/13/let-s-put-an-end-toprosecutorial-immunity.
119. One example comes by way of an Ohio prosecutor who claimed that citizens breaking
quarantine for relatively innocent activities such as gathering in a group with friends would be
charged with felonious assault, raising the concern that the prosecutor's office at issue may
encourage unconstitutional charging decisions by other prosecutors in other situations. Page, supra
note 3; Knight, supra note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note 3; Morefield, supra
note 3.
120. See, e.g., Herb Scribner, Idaho Mother Arrested After She Refused to Leave a Playground
Area

Closed Because

of Coronavirus, DESERET

NEWS

(Apr.

23,

2020,

8:15

AM),

https://www.deseret.com/u-s-world/2020/4/23/21231395/idaho-sara-brady-playground-coronaviruscovid-19-pandemic-ban.
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other similar locations would be considered draconian and almost
unquestionably unconstitutional. 2 1 Nevertheless, following federal
recommendations from the Trump Administration, along with several
scholarly sources within the United States and abroad, many states have
issued these regulations to slow the rate of a deadly disease spreading
22
across America, enforcing them quite stringently in some cases.
a. Empirical Research Opportunities
The natural question, of course, is whether these restrictions are
justified by rational, important, or compelling government purposes that
would allow the government to limit constitutional rights.1 23 It is in this
balancing where many actions of law enforcement that result in
detentions, arrests, and/or charges may be questioned as civil rights
violations under the Civil Rights Act and perhaps various state statutes
and common law principles. 24 Yet, the subsequent prosecutions that
take place based on these arrests, no matter how misguided, will yield no
liability for prosecutors. 2 5 Thus, empiricists might be able to calculate
the cost of absolute immunity of prosecutors to those individuals who
recover from police officer misconduct under the Civil Rights Act (and
perhaps others) but who cannot recover from the prosecutor for similar
or identical misconduct in proceedings with unjustified charges.
Let us assume that the misconduct of a prosecutor who refused to
dismiss charges against a defendant that later recovered against the
arresting officer is similar to the misconduct of the police officer. For
example, the law enforcement officer makes a legal determination of
whether the action(s) he or she observes is a crime for which the U.S.
Constitution would permit an arrest. 2 6 The same example could
encompass a police officer receiving a report of a crime. Similarly, a
prosecutor must determine whether he or she can proceed with charges
against the defendant on the basis of the probable cause submitted to the

121. The Public Forum., LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.comell.edu/constitutionconan/amendment-1/the-public-forum (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
122. See Schaefers, supra note 3; Johnson & Wolf, supra note 3; Gearty, supra note 3;
Murdock, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 3; Li, supra note 3; Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra
note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note 3; Morefield, supra note 3.
123. Mariam Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT L. (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://subscriptlaw.comlevels-of-scrutiny.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Police Misconduct and Civil Rights, FINDLAW (July 20, 2017),
https://civirights.findlaw.com/civil-rights-overview/police-misconduct-and-civil-rights.html.
125. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
126. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET AL., NAT'L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., POLICE OFFICERS'
DECISION MAKING AND DISCRETION: FORMING SUSPICION AND MAKING A STOP (2004),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/213004.pdf.
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prosecutor (and to the court) by the law enforcement officer.1 27 Roughly
speaking, if a police officer and a prosecutor both proceed on a case
where the U.S. Constitution would exonerate the defendant, they both
make an identical error. The difference is, though, that the law
enforcement officer can be held liable in civil proceedings for making an
illegal arrest under an unconstitutional statute while the prosecutor,
ordinarily, cannot. 128
We can then look to the wrongful acts of law enforcement that
resulted in subsequent prosecution as a situation where, but for absolute
immunity, the prosecutor would have been held liable as well. 129 While
this will yield only a rough estimation, we can then sum the verdict
amounts against misbehaving officers and estimate that victims failed to
recover similar sums from prosecutors and thus could not be made
whole. In the alternative, we might conclude that the prosecutor would
have been jointly and severally liable for the amount, at least shifting the
burden of making a legal miscalculation from the law enforcement
officer (and the officer's department) to the prosecutor (and the
prosecutor's office). These calculations may help policymakers see the
true costs of allowing absolute immunity for prosecutors. However,
because the data will only become available after lawsuits are filed and
resolved, with filing dates delayed for as much as two years if not more
(especially assuming the leeway the statutes of limitations provide), this
cannot yet be accomplished.
b. Notorious COVID-19 Prosecutions
Unfortunately, we need not simply imagine potential prosecutorial
misconduct during the COVID-19 pandemic. 130 An Ohio prosecutor, for
example, remarked that congregating in a group outside, despite Ohio's
shelter-in-place COVID-19 order, constituted felonious assault and
therefore justified the arrest and prosecution of all individuals that do so
for second-degree felony.13 1 This statement was made in a time when
individuals were being released from incarceration due to the virus,
127. Anatomy of a Criminal Case, CNTY. SANTA CLARA OFF. DIST. ATT'Y (Aug. 16, 2018
12:08 PM), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/prosecution/anatomyofcriminalcase.
128. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1983); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
129. To uphold these assumptions, the researcher would eliminate cases where prosecution
occurred due to error only attributable to the law enforcement officer, such as perjury under oath
without the knowledge of the prosecutor.

130. Schaefers, supranote 3; Johnson & Wolf, supra note 3; Gearty, supra note 3; Murdock,
supra note 3; Brown, supra note 3; Li, supra note 3; Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra note 3;

Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note 3; Morefield, supra note 3.
131. Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note
3; Morefield, supra note 3.
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despite past acts that were significantly more repugnant to public
order.132 What made the statement particularly remarkable is that the
prosecutor likened gathering in a group to an action threatening the lives
of his children, suggesting that he would ensure the offenders be arrested
and receive no bond. 33
Felonious assault, as defined in Ohio statutes, can be applied to
diseases (usually sexually transmitted diseases), but a look at the statute
reveals the difficulties of succeeding on a felonious assault charge for
violating the shelter-in-place order.3 4 First, the prosecution would have
to demonstrate that the individuals gathering outside of their homes for
non-approved reasons under the quarantine order actually had the virus
and were contagious at the time that they set foot outside. 3 5 After all,
how can someone be charged with infecting others with a virus that the
defendant has no way of spreading?
The statute also requires knowledge on the part of the quarantine
violator that he or she has the disease. 136 That is the crux of appellate
court precedent concerning the transfer of dangerous diseases such as
HIV/AIDS and subsequent prosecution under the felonious assault
13
Hence, unless the prosecution could establish that the
statute.?
individuals arrested and charged with felonious assault knew they had
COVID-19, there would be no probable cause to back the charge. 3 8 At a
time when tests for COVID-19 were difficult to obtain, and when
evidence existed that many could be carriers prior to exhibiting
symptoms (or without having any symptoms at any point), charging an
individual with a serious felony when the individual was probably
uninfected and when, even if the individual was infected, the individual
probably did not know it, is almost by definition charging someone
without probable cause.1 39
Furthermore, the Ohio felonious assault statute requires that the
defendant cause serious physical harm to another to be found guilty of
132. Eligon, supra note 3; Londofio et al., supra note 3; Bella, supra note 3; Givas, supra note
3; Newman, supra note 3; Choe, supra note 3; Kendall & Salonga, supra note 3; Hoerner, supra
note 3.
133. Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note
3; Morefield, supra note 3.
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (LexisNexis 2020); see State v. Davis, No.
2012-Ohio-5756, 2012 WL 6085366, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012); see, e.g., State v. Price,
834 N.E.2d 847, 848-49 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
135. § 2903.11; see Davis, 2012 WL 6085366, at *4-5; see, e.g., Price, 834 N.E. 2d at 848-50.
136. § 2903.11.
137. Id.; see Davis, 2012 WL 6085366, at *4-5; see, e.g., Price, 834 N.E.2d at 848-49.
138. § 2903.11; see Davis, 2012 wL 6085366, at *4-5; see, e.g., Price, 834 N.E.2d at 848-49.
139. Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra note 3; Coolidge, supra note 3; Mastrangelo, supra note
3; Morefield, supra note 3.
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the charge. 14 0 There are, of course, ample difficulties in proving, beyond
a reasonable doubt, which person infected the victim in a potential
felonious assault litigation arising out of COVID-19 and whether serious
damage resulted from the infection. After all, contact tracing is not an
exact science, especially given the prevalence of COVID-19 in the
United States and the large amount of community spread exhibited by
the virus.14 1 Various public figures have had contact with infected
individuals without contracting the virus, including former President
Donald Trump himself (who contracted the virus later via some other
form of transmission). 142 Hence, it should be almost impossible to prove
to a jury that an individual spread the virus to someone else simply by
gathering outside, given the multitude of alternative sources of
infection.' 43 In fact, it may be hard to even meet the probable cause bar
on this prong of the statute alone, since infection from a person who is
outside and not wearing a mask seems at least somewhat unlikely."
Rates of transmitting the disease are well below fifty percent, especially
in unconfined spaces outdoors.14 5 Thus, no matter the victim, it would be
140.

§ 2903.11.

141.

Holly Yan & Scottie Andrew, You Asked, We're Answering: Your Top Coronavirus

Questions, CNN

(Jan.

27, 2021),

https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/health/coronavirus-

questions-answers; Does Coronavirus Spread Outside?, ROCHESTER REG'L HEALTH (May 29,

2020), https://hive.rochesterregional.org/2020/05/coronavirus-spread-outside.
142.

Kaitlan Collins & Peter Morris, One of Trump's Personal Valets Has Tested Positivefor

Coronavirus,CNN (May 7, 2020, 6:09 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/07/politics/trump-valettests-positive-covid-19/index.html.
143. In fact, it may be hard to even qualify experts to testify about the virus, given the high
error rates in prognosis, diagnosis, and treatment approaches. See generally, e.g., Artem M. Joukov,
Who's the Expert? Frye and Daubert in Alabama, 47 CIMB. L. REv. 275 (2017). It is still unclear
whether the nation's leading experts have enough information to draw informed conclusions about
the virus that would satisfy the Frye or the Daubert standard. Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra
note 3.
144. Aylin Woodward, You're Less Likely to Catch the CoronavirusOutdoors, but the Amount
of Time You Spend near Other People Matters Most, BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2020, 9:02 AM),

https://www.businessinsider.com/risk-of-coronavirus-transmission-lower-outdoors-evidence-20205; Julie Mazziotta, The Risk of Getting Coronavirus Outdoors Is Low-If PrecautionsAre Taken,

PEOPLE (May 18, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://people.com/health/risk-getting-coronavirus-outdoors-lowwith-precautions; Sigal Samuel, Why You're Unlikely to Get the Coronavirusfrom Runners or

Cyclists, vox (Aug. 13, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2020/4/24/21233226/
Erin Billups, Risk of Coronavirus
coronavirus-runners-cyclists-airborne-infectious-dose;
Transmission Is Lower Outdoors, Experts Say, SPECTRUM BAY NEWS 9 (May 22, 2020, 10:25 AM),
https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/coronavirus/2020/05/21 /risk-of-coronavirus-transmission-islower-outdoors--experts-say; Kea Wilson, Chinese Study Finds Outdoor Activities Safe from
COVID, STREETSBLOG USA (May 15, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/05/15/chinese-studyfinds-outdoor-activities-safe-from-covid; Does CoronavirusSpread Outside?, supra note 141; Yan
& Andrew, supra note 141.

145.

Woodward, supra note 144; Mazziotta, supra note 144; Samuel, supra note 144; Billups,

supra note 144; Wilson, supra note 144; Does Coronavirus Spread Outside?, supra note 141; Yan
& Andrew, supra note 141.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

336

[Vol. 49:315

more probable that the defendant did not spread the virus to him or her
than the opposite.1 46 It would be more probable that the victim
contracted the illness elsewhere, especially given the multitude of ways
COVID-19 could be transmitted and the large number of individuals that
possessed antibodies for the virus without any notable symptoms
(suggesting that the virus spread to millions of citizens across the United
47
States without being traceable to a particular source).1
Even if a prosecutor could establish the probable transmission of
the virus, it seems clear that the prosecutor would have difficulty
meeting the requirement of "serious physical harm to another or to
another's unborn" in most instances.1 48 COVID-19, while clearly
extremely serious in some cases, is overwhelmingly not serious in many
others.1 49 In the United States, few cases result in death or even
hospitalization compared to the number of people infected. 50 Antibody
tests, which became available several months after the pandemic began,
showed that a large percentage of the United States population had the
virus without feeling particularly ill or visiting a doctor. 151 These tests
confirmed that the number of reported cases understated the number of
actual infections by orders of magnitude, lowering the calculated death
rate and also suggesting that a larger portion of the population than
previously thought had already developed antibodies for the illness and
may not be susceptible to infection from quarantine violators. 2 These
facts would suggest that the odds of COVID-19 passing from quarantine
53
violators and doing serious physical harm were low.'
Given all of the evidence that COVID-19 may be less harmful than
previously thought, as well as significant scientific disagreement about

146.

Woodward, supra note 144; Mazziotta, supra note 144; Samuel, supra note 144; Billups,

supra note 144; Wilson, supra note 144; Does CoronavirusSpread Outside?, supra note 141; Yan

& Andrew, supra note 141.
147. Woodward, supra note 144; Mazziotta, supra note 144; Samuel, supra note 144; Billups,
supra note 144; Wilson, supra note 144; Does CoronavirusSpread Outside?, supra note 141; Yan

& Andrew, supra note 141.
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (LexisNexis 2020).
149. Yan & Andrew, supra note 141; Coronavirus:A Timeline of How the Deadly COVID-19
Outbreak Is Evolving, supranote 4.

150.

Yan & Andrew, supra note 141; Coronavirus:A Timeline of How the Deadly COVID-19

OutbreakIs Evolving, supranote 4.

151. Yan & Andrew, supra note 141; Coronavirus:A Timeline of How the Deadly COVID-19
Outbreak Is Evolving, supra note 4; Mark Terry, FDA Approves 1st COVID-19 Antibody Test,
BIOSPACE (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.biospace.com/article/fda-approves-1st-covid-19-antibodytest.
152.

Jon Hamilton, Antibody Tests Point to Lower Death Rate for the Coronavirusthan First

Thought, NPR (May 28, 2020, 1:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/28/
863944333/antibody-tests-point-to-lower-death-rate-for-the-coronavirus-than-first-thought.
153. Id.
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the scope and ultimate impact of the infection, ordinary citizens were
free to form their own conclusions about the threat of COVID-19.1 54 A
perfectly reasonable conclusion, given the large rate of recovery and
asymptomatic cases, would have been that the virus would not cause
serious harm to most.' Therefore, it would be difficult for any
prosecutor to prove that a defendant knew he or she would cause serious
physical harm to another person when the defendant may have logically
believed the opposite.
A person can be convicted of transmitting certain diseases to others
under Ohio's felonious assault statute under a sub-portion of the law
aimed particularly at a very narrowly-defined class of diseases.1 56 At
first glance, the narrow class of diseases discussed in the statute would
probably exclude COVID-19, but since the symptoms are not yet fully
understood within the medical and scientific community, let us assume
that COVID-19 is a "virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome." 15 7 Under the statute, individuals who test positive for the
virus and become aware of their positive test results must refrain from a
list of activities that are permissible to everyone else.1 58 For example,
they may not engage in sexual conduct with others without warning
them of their illness. 5 9 They must also avoid engaging in sexual conduct
with individuals who are under eighteen unless bound by marriage, and
they must avoid sexual contact with those who may lack the mental
capacity to understand the seriousness of the communicable
immunodeficiency syndrome which may be passed on to them as a result
of sexual activity. '0 Generally speaking, this portion of the statute
ordinarily pertains to people who have contracted HIV/AIDS.161
Let us assume, without evidence, that COVID-19 had an
immunodeficiency syndrome component that became apparent laterperhaps several weeks or months after contracting and apparently
overcoming the disease. Could a prosecutor justify his call for
prosecuting individuals for felonious assault under this statute due to
their choice to violate quarantine orders? The answer, once more, must
be "no." Just as the more general portion of the felonious assault statute
would require the defendant to have knowledge of infection, the same is

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (LexisNexis 2020).
Id. § 2903.11(B).
Id.
Id. § 2903.11(B)(1).
Id. § 2903.11(B)(2), (3).
See State v. Price, 834 N.E. 2d 847, 848-50 (Ohio App. Ct. 2005).
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62
true regarding the law concerning immunodeficiency syndromes. It is
unlikely that a prosecutor would have proof, in the vast majority of
cases, that individuals tested positive for COVID-19 at any point prior to
leaving their homes, that they were aware of their positive test results, or
that the infected individuals knew COVID-19 was a type of
immunodeficiency syndrome (since we do not know that, scientifically,
even today). When it comes to the mens rea part of the statute, the
prosecutor would have almost no way of establishing probable cause for
his case, much less proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if
knowledge could be established, the statute specifically bans sexual
conduct, not any other type of activity that might spread the
immunodeficiency syndrome.1 63 Therefore, gathering with friends
1
outside one's home during a quarantine does not meet this criteria. 6"
After several weeks of watching individuals face fines, arrest, or
both, the response to COVID-19 drew the ire of former Federal Attorney
General William Barr, who directed federal prosecutors to be on the
lookout for overbearing provisions, suggesting that despite the threat
COVID-19 might pose, the solutions concocted by some states may
violate the U.S. Constitution. 165 Of course, prosecutors should not be
waiting for orders from the United States Attorney General in
considering the constitutionality of various statutes, as Barr's directive at
least implies certain statutes may not be constitutional."6 The same can
be true of various non-statutory lockdown orders across the United
States, whether issued by mayors or governors. Perhaps most
importantly, Barr alluded that a pandemic may not constitute a
justification for perpetual restrictions on human rights that may arguably
167
go beyond what is necessary to curtail its spread.
Take, for example, the case of the Dallas, Texas hairdresser who
received a seven-day jail sentence following her conviction for opening
her hair salon in violation of a stay-at-home order: she received a

162. See § 2903.11(B); Price, 834 N.E. 2d at 849-50.
163. See § 2903.11(B)(1), (2).
164. See id.; Page, supra note 3; Knight, supra note 3.
165. David Shortell, Attorney General William Barr Tells Prosecutors to Be on Watch for
'Overbearing' Coronavirus Measures, CNN (Apr. 27, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
04/27/politics/barr-prosecutors-coronavirus-civil-liberties/index.html; Michael Balsamo, Barr to
Prosecutors: Look for Unconstitutional Virus Rules,

ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 27, 2020),

https://apnews.com/article/c76e764141179075244ecfd5flbb5e19;
Prosecutors to

Matt Zapotosky,

Barr Tells

'Be on the Lookout' for State, Local Coronavirus Orders that May Violate

Constitution, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
9
32
2
national/attorney-general-barr-coronavirus-state-restrictions/2020/04/ 7/a58 ce-88b -1lea-ac8afe9b8088e101.
166. Shortell, supra note 165; Balsamo, supra note 165; Zapotosky, supra note 165.
167. Shortell, supra note 165; Balsamo, supra note 165; Zapotosky, supra note 165.
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conviction for her actions almost immediately. 168 Even though there
were few indicators that she had a criminal history or that she was
endangering anyone, she received no deferred prosecution agreement
from the prosecution. 169 She did not receive a short term of probation.17 0
Instead, she received a penalty that few felons receive: actual loss of
liberty for the duration of a week.17 1
While the prosecution, conviction, and sentence did occur under the
color of Texas law, there were many obvious reasons why the
prosecution was at worst, unconstitutional, and at best, an instance
where the defendant should have received mercy when compared to
similarly-situated cases (or even to instances where the defendant
committed significantly graver offenses). First, whether governments
can shutter businesses on the grounds of a disease that is not very deadly
is now going to be an open question. 172 The constitutionality of
quarantines under various circumstances is going to be analyzed in
courts for the better part of the next decade. 173 Second, there are no
obvious reasons why the defendant's hair salon was any less essential
than many of the other businesses permitted to operate during the same
time across the nation and in Dallas particularly. 174 Third, given the fact
that prosecutors frequently elect not to prosecute various offenses, why
this particular defendant suffered prosecution may be a selective
prosecution question.1 75 Fourth, hairstyles are frequently considered an
expressive activity with which the stylist assists, impairment of which

168. See Rebecca Lopez & Eline de Bruijn, Dallas Salon Owner Who Refused to Close
Sentenced to Seven Days in Jail, Ordered to Pay Fines, TEX. TIUB. (May 5, 2020, 5:00 PM),

https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/05/dallas-salon-owner-jail-sentence-reopening-shelleyluther-coronavirus.
169. See Meagan Flynn & Hannah Knowles, DallasHair Salon Owner Chose JailRather than
Close Her Doors. She Was Just Released, WASH. POST (May 7, 2020, 5:56 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/06/dallas-salon-owner-jailed-coronavirus;
Nic
Garcia et al., Meet the Dallas Salon Owner Whose Decision to Reopen Put Her in the Middle of a

National Debate, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 6, 2020, 9:03 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/politics/2020/05/06/meet-the-dallas-salon-owner-whose-rule-breaking-put-her-in-the-middleof-a-national-debate (acknowledging the salon owner's lack of a prior criminal history).

170. Lopez & de Bruijn, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172.

See John Malcolm & Charles "Cully" Stimson,

"Constitution Isn't Suspended" for

COVID-19, Attorney General Barr Warns Public Officials, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/commentary/constitution-isnt-suspended-covid-19attorney-general-barr-warns-public.
173. See id.
174. Maria Halkias, Still Not Sure if Your Business Is Essential? There's a Form for That,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 14, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/
business/retail/2020/04/14/still-not-sure-whether-your-business-is-essential-theres-a-form-for-that.
175.

See, e.g., Blackledge

v.

Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974).
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may constitute an impairment of the freedom of expression.1'7 6 Fifth, the
sentence sought by the prosecution and ultimately imposed by the judge
was likely disparate compared to more serious crimes.
The response to the prosecution was highly negative.177 Everyone
from the Governor of Texas to the State Attorney General condemned
the decision to sentence this business owner to seven days in jail. 178 This
sentence, of course, could not have taken place at all but for the
prosecution of the defendant by the local prosecutor. 179 The judge
seemed to suffer far more backlash, though, for reprimanding the
defendant as selfish and asking her to apologize for her conduct to avoid
sentencing.1 80 When the defendant refused to apologize for keeping her
business open, the judge sentenced her to jail.' 8 ' The public response
was so overwhelmingly in opposition to this decision that many voted
with their wallets, despite the economic plight across the nation. The
campaign to raise this business owner's legal fees crossed the $500,000
mark almost immediately after her story hit the presses. 8 2 Given the
revealed preference of individuals struggling with the economic plight
brought on by COVID-19 to spend precious funds on the legal fees of
another suggests a strong objection from the American public to
83
prosecutors targeting business owners under dubious legal authority.'
The role of prosecutors, and state attorneys general who acted in
their capacity as prosecutors, should not be overlooked in the wake of
this pandemic. It is precisely these lawyers who should have at least
suggested to governors and legislators that the laws they were seeking to
promulgate might breach constitutional guarantees of freedom. In the
event the state promulgated the laws anyway, these lawyers had the
responsibility of refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws via their oath
to protect and preserve the U.S. Constitution. While some law
enforcement officers refused to enforce potentially unconstitutional

176. See, e.g., Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 941-43 (7th Cir. 1972).
177. Mary Claire Patton, Texas Governor, Attorney General Callfor Release of Dallas Salon
Owner Jailed for Keeping Business Open, KSAT (May 6, 2020, 1:39 PM),
https://www.ksat.com/news/texas/2020/05/06/texas-governor-attorney-general-call-for-release-ofdallas-salon-owner-jailed-for-keeping-business-open.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Emily Czachor, GoFundMe Raises More than $500,000 for Dallas Hair Salon Owner
Arrested for Opening Business Despite Coronavirus Restrictions, NEWSWEEK (May 12, 2020, 1:35

PM), https://www.newsweek.com/gofundme-raises-more-500000-dallas-hair-salon-owner-arrestedopening-business-despite-1503496.
183. Id.
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regulations, we are less aware of similar refusals from lawyers.184 Could
it be because law enforcement officers knew they could be held liable
while prosecutors cloaked themselves in absolute immunity?
2. Problems Unrelated to COVID-19
Prosecutorial misconduct, in the context of COVID-19
overreaching or otherwise, can comprise many different forms (in
addition to those mentioned above), including: (1) charging a suspect
with more offenses than warranted, (2) withholding or delaying the
release of exculpatory evidence, (3) deliberately mishandling,
mistreating, or destroying evidence, (4) permitting witnesses that
prosecutors know or should know are not truthful to testify, (5)
pressuring defense witnesses not to testify, (6) relying on fraudulent
forensic experts, (7) overstating the strength of the evidence during plea
negotiations, (8) making statements to the media designed to arouse
public indignation, (9) making improper or misleading statements to the
jury, and (10) failing to report prosecutorial misconduct when it is
discovered.185 However, because prosecutors are rarely held liable for
any misconduct, prosecutors' offices have long been deemed to have a
culture of infallibility.186 This infallibility mindset gives rise to
"practices that can only be termed bizarre, such as prosecutors who

184. Maurice Chammah, The Rise of the Anti-Lockdown Shernffs, MARSHALL PROJECT (May
18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/18/the-rise-of-the-anti-lockdownsheriffs; Zoe Nemerever, Why 'ConstitutionalistSherifs' Won't Enforce Coronavirus Restrictions,

WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2020, 7:45 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/23/whyconstitutional-sheriffs-wont-enforce-coronavirus-restrictions; Hayley Fowler, Some Cops, Sheriffs
Won't Enforce 'Unconstitutional' COVID-19 Orders. Can They Do That?, NEWS & OBSERVER

(May

28,

2020,

6:55

PM),

https://www.newsobserver.com/news/coronavirus/

article243054951.html; Ray Stem, Two Arizona County Sheriffs Are Refusing to Enforce Corona

Emergency
Orders,
PHx.
NEW
TIMES
(May
1,
2020,
3:55
https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/arizona-county-sheriffs-refuse-to-enforce-covid-19coronavirus-lockdown-orders-pinal-mohave-11468354; Will Sommer, Sheriffs Buck the
Refuse to Enforce Lockdown Orders, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 23, 2020, 10:36
https://www.thedailybeast.com/sheriffs-buck-the-law-refuse-to-enforce-lockdown-orders;

PM),
Law,
AM),
Tracy

Connor, It's Not Just Sheriffs-Now Prosecutors Refuse to Enforce Illinois Lockdown, DAILY

BEAST (May 16, 2020, 2:59 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/prosecutors-refuse-to-enforceillinois-gov-jb-pritzkers-lockdown; Jonathan Oosting, Police: Don't Expect Us to Enforce
Michigan's

Confusing

Coronavirus

Lockdown,

BRIDGE

MICH.

(Mar.

24,

2020),

https://www.bridgeni.com/michigan-government/police-dont-expect-us-enforce-michigansconfusing-coronavirus-lockdown; Maurice Chammah, Anti-Lockdown Sheriffs Call on Constituent
Power to Push Back on Coronavirus Restrictions, USA TODAY (May 26, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2020/05/24/coronavirus-anti-lockdown-sheriffs-defyinggovernors-orders/5247134002.
185.

An Epidemic of ProsecutorMisconduct, supranote 75.

186. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

342

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:315

reportedly wear neckties decorated with images of nooses or who throw
a party after 'winning' a death sentence. "187
The case of Anthony Graves serves as yet another example of such
misconduct. The case is extremely unusual, unfortunately not because of
the prosecutor's egregious violation of the law, but because the
prosecutor was actually disbarred by the State of Texas as a result.1 88
Generally, when prosecutors break the law by concealing exculpatory
evidence or engaging in other misconduct, a "slap-on-the-wrist" is the
most severe punishment imposed.1 89 According to United States Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski, it is "almost unheard of' that prosecutors are
punished for their misconduct, and the cases that have led to punishment
are extremely few and far between.1 90 When prosecutors do face
repercussions for misconduct, it is when their behavior is deemed to be
egregious and deliberate-and even in such cases, the punishment they
receive is rarely proportional to the significant damage they inflict upon
innocent persons.191
Two other attorneys that have received some of the most severe
sanctions ever inflicted on prosecutors are Mike Nifong and Ken
Anderson. 92 Nifong was involved in a case wherein three members of
the Duke University lacrosse team were falsely accused of rape.1 93
Nifong withheld DNA evidence, and as a result, was disbarred.' 94
Anderson, a former Texas prosecutor and judge, intentionally withheld
evidence in a case against an innocent man who wrongfully spent
twenty-five years in prison for allegedly murdering his wife.1 95
Anderson was disbarred, ordered to perform five hundred hours of
community service, and spent ten days in jail in 2013.196 Astonishingly,
Anderson was the first prosecutor ever to go to jail for withholding
evidence.1 97 However, it is alarming that he successfully rose through

187. Id.
188. DA Disbarredfor Sending Texas Man to Death Row, CBS NEWS (June 12, 2015, 6:05
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/charles-sebasta-prosecutor-of-wrongfully-convicted-mananthony-graves-loses-law-license.
189.

See Peter B. Collins, Prosecutors Who Break the Law Face No Punishment, WHO WHAT

WHY (July 3, 2018), https://whowhatwhy.org/2018/07/03/prosecutors-who-break-the-law-face-nopunishment.
190. Ferner, supra note 43.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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the legal ranks not only as a prosecutor, but also as a judge, before
finally being held accountable.
Another example of prosecutorial misconduct might be the failure
to prosecute offenders. Citizens rely on the criminal laws of their
community to be enforced only to find out that the protections they
relied on are illusory. This can be just as problematic as false
prosecutions. In the Ahmaud Arbery case, for example, Georgia
residents might have expected prosecutors to prosecute citizens for
murder or similar violent offenses. 198 Yet residents were confronted with
the reality that if the alleged murder was committed by someone
well-known to the local prosecutor, the prosecution might never
commence.199 It is possible that if the video of the incident never leaked
to the public, the perpetrators would never have been scrutinized for a
homicide that will very likely lead to convictions. 200 Similarly, the
citizens of Chicago probably thought that providing false information to
the police could be criminally punishable because it wastes taxpayer
resources and prevents officers from being available to stop real crime.
Yet, when Jussie Smollett hired two Nigerian men to "assault" him and
then reported it to the police as a race-related attack by Trump
supporters, the charges against him were mysteriously dismissed despite
overwhelming evidence of guilt provided by the Chicago Police
Department. 201 Prosecutorial acts like these are just as reprehensible to

198. Andone et al., supra note 4; Miller & Hauck, supra note 4; Schindler & Kless, supra note
4; Wootson & Itkowitz, supra note 4; Lennard, supra note 4; Shah, supra note 4; Booker, supra
note 4; Stimson, supra note 4.
199. Andone et al., supra note 4; Miller & Hauck, supra note 4; Schindler & Kless, supra note
4; Wootson & Itkowitz, supra note 4; Lennard, supra note 4; Shah, supra note 4; Booker, supra
note 4.
200. Andone et al., supra note 4; Miller & Hauck, supra note 4; Schindler & Kless, supra note
4; Wootson & Itkowitz, supra note 4; Lennard, supra note 4; Shah, supra note 4; Booker, supra
note 4; Stimson, supra note 4.
201. Gabrielle Fonrouge, Abel and Ola Osundairo Will Testify Against Jussie Smollett After
All, PAGE Six (June 25, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://pagesix.com/2020/06/25/abel-and-ola-osundairowill-testify-against-jussie-smollett; Sasha Savitsky, Jussie Smollett's Alleged Attackers Now Say
They Will Testify: We Will 'Continue to Tell the Truth,' Fox NEWS (June 25, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/jussie-smollett-alleged-attackers-now-say-they-willtestify; Don Babwin & Herb McCann, Actor Jussie Smollett Faces 6 New Charges in Chicago,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://apnews.com/ae6ecdc8dfa7b5af555071033b2b2a7b; E.
Jason Wambsgans, Jussie Smollett Case: Special ProsecutorNamed to Look into Why Prosecutors

Dropped Charges, NBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2019, 11:32 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/jussie-smollett-case-special-prosecutor-named-look-why-prosecutors-dropped-n1045781;
Julie Bosman & Sopan Deb, Jussie Smollett's Charges Are Dropped, Angering Mayor and Police,

N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/arts/television/jussie-smollettcharges-dropped.html; Adam Gabbatt, Jussie Smollett: Why Were the Charges Dropped and What
Happens Next?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2019, 12:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usDeanna
news/2019/mar/27/jussie-smollet-why-were-the-charges-dropped-and-what-happens-next;
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the cause of justice, and they help perpetuate the harmful assumption of
many that justice favors the wealthy and more well-connected.
In 2013, the Center for Prosecutor Integrity demonstrated the rarity
of prosecutors facing punishment for their misconduct. 202 Using data
from nine major studies that investigated prosecutorial misconduct at the
state and national levels, the Center for Prosecutor Integrity identified
3,625 cases of prosecutorial misconduct between 1963 and 2013.203
Astonishingly, of those cases, only sixty-three prosecutors-less than
two percent-were ever sanctioned for their misconduct. 204 When a
sanction was imposed, the sanction largely represented minor
disciplinary actions.2 05 For instance, the most common sanction was to
assess disciplinary hearing costs on the prosecutor. 206 Only in a mere
fourteen instances was a prosecutor suspended or disbarred from
practicing. 207 Even then, it is unclear whether the punishment deprived
the prosecutor of the fruits of his or her misconduct since the money and
status he or she gained might well have exceeded what could have been
if the prosecutor played by the rules. Moreover, because of absolute civil
immunity, these decisions still cannot be used to compel prosecutors to
pay for the damages of their actual victims.
Several additional studies show similar results. A 1987 study
revealed that in a six-year period, disciplinary sanctions for prosecutors
accused of suppressing evidence were in the single digits. 208 In 1999, the
Chicago Tribune studied 381 cases where courts overturned homicide
convictions because of prosecutors hiding evidence or presenting false
testimony, finding that none of the prosecutors involved faced
disbarment or criminal sanctions. 209 In 2010, the Northern California
Innocence Project discovered that California State Bar officials publicly
disciplined only one percent of prosecutors in the 600 cases where courts

Paul, Why ProsecutorsDismissed the ChargesAgainst Jussie Smollett, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2019,
11:15
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2019/03/27/why-prosecutorsdismissed-charges-against-jussie-smollett; Jussie Smollett: ProsecutorsDrop All Charges Against

Actor, BBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47711535; Nicole
Chavez, Why Did ProsecutorsDrop All ChargesAgainst Jussie Smollett, CNN (Mar. 27, 2019, 3:58
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/27/entertainment/experts-jussie-smollett-why-prosecutorsdropped-charges.
202.

An Epidemic of ProsecutorMisconduct, supra note 75.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sarma, supra note 25.
Id.
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found prosecutorial misconduct. 210 Unfortunately, holding prosecutors
responsible for blatant misconduct violations seems to be the exception
rather than the rule.
We would hope that the majority of prosecutors likely behave
ethically. 211 However, even one unethical prosecutor in a prosecutor's
212
office can inflict significant harm on defendants and their cases.
Regrettably, based upon the data currently available, it is clear that there
are more than just a few unethical prosecutors. 2 13 According to Judge
Kozinski, prosecutorial misconduct "ranges. from misleading the jury, to
outright lying in court and tacitly acquiescing or actively participating in
the presentation of false evidence by police." 214 Moreover, it is difficult
to identify the misconduct, because the majority of prosecutors' conduct
is behind the scenes, such as gathering evidence and working with police
and investigators. 215 As a result, misconduct often goes undiscovered
until years after a person has been convicted and his or her life
considerably impacted.2 16 In many cases, prosecutorial misbehavior is
never discovered at all. 217 However, misconduct by prosecutors occurs
so often that it has been deemed one of the primary causes of wrongful
convictions.2 1 8
There are several ethical standards governing the practices of
prosecutors that are supposed to hold prosecutors responsible for
misconduct. Theoretically, violations of these standards should either
prevent misconduct by resulting in disbarment or other discipline, which
would serve both as a specific deterrent to a lawyer from engaging in
future misconduct and a general deterrent to others by his example. One
of the more important and well-known of these is ABA Model Rule 3.8,
Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.2 19 Most states adopt the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (sometimes with minor
modifications), which the ABA House of Delegates adopted in 1983, so
this rule applies to many (if not all) prosecutors across the United
States. 22 0 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require individuals
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Ferner, supra note 43.
Id.
Id.
Kozinski, supra note 17, at xxii-xxiii (internal footnotes omitted).
Id. at xxiii; Ferner, supra note 43.
Ferner, supra note 43.
Id.
Id.
219. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019).
220. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rulesof professional conduct (last visited
Feb. 8, 2021); see, e.g., RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.8 (the version of ABA Model Rule 3.8
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to comply with several restrictions, including rules concerning client
confidentiality, solicitation and advertising, the report of misconduct by
other attorneys, and the prohibition of certain conflicts of interest.2
Attorneys who violate these rules may face disciplinary action ranging

from private reprimand to disbarment.2 2
Given the broad requirements under ABA Model Rule 3.8, the oath
of all lawyers to protect and defend the U.S. Constitution, and other
ethical guidelines to which prosecutors are subject, 223 the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct cannot be blamed on a lack of ethical
guidance.2 24 Rather, prosecutorial misconduct can be based, in part, on
the failure to discipline prosecutors when they do engage in misconduct
and, in part, by refusing to allow affected parties to seek redress in the
courts, as discussed throughout this Article. 225 While it may be
unpopular to take the side of a defendant accused of a serious crime, one
would think that state bars would take this issue more seriously.
Unfortunately, we find no evidence that this is so. 226
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

There are many consequences of the use of government power to
Unfortunately, the judicially-created rule
prosecute the innocent. 2
preventing victims from civil recovery results in defendants, not
prosecutors, facing the consequences of prosecutors' misdeeds. 2 28 Of
course, there are externalities as well: society bears a cost for increased
incarceration, probation, and other types of monitoring, and wrongfully
prosecuting an innocent person results in the potential loss of a
productive member of society to jail or prison. 22 9 Even if the wrongly
applicable in Florida); ALA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCr r. 3.8 (the version of ABA Model Rule 3.8
applicable in Alabama); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT tbl. of contents (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019).
221.

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT tbl. of contents (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019).

222. Rule 10: Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, A.B.A. (July 20, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/resources/lawyerethics_regulatio
n/model_rules_for_lawyerdisciplinaryenforcement/rule_10.
223. Prosecutors are also required or encouraged to follow the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, entitled the "Prosecution Function," the United States Attorneys' Manual, and The National
Prosecution Standards.
224. An Epidemic of ProsecutorMisconduct, supranote 75.
225. Id.
226. Femer, supra note 43.
227. What Long-Term Consequences Could a Criminal Conviction Have on My Life?,
GREENSPUN SHAPIRO PC, https://www.greenspunlaw.com/faqs/life-long-costs-of-a-criminalconviction.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
228. See id.
229.

See

Prosecutorial

Misconduct,

CAL.

INNOCENCE

https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/prosecutorial-misconduct
2021).
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accused finds himself or herself exonerated at the end of the
proceedings, the cost of bringing the case and diminishing the
defendant's reputation is borne by society (including the defendant), not
by a prosecutor responsible for the frivolous criminal litigation in the
first place. 230 The defendant often bears the burden of the legal and
emotional costs of facing the chance of imprisonment, or perhaps the
death penalty, despite having done nothing wrong. In instances where
the defendant cannot afford an attorney, taxpayers pay for the costs of
representation and the associated investigative expenses. 231
A.

Overcrowding in Jails and Prisons

One of the many consequences that results from prosecutorial
misconduct is severe overcrowding in jails and prisons.232 While the
overuse of imprisonment is a serious problem around the world, the
"human rights violations associated with this practice are particularly
egregious in the context of the United States." 233 With an incarceration
rate of five to ten times that of other western democracies, the United
States has the highest incarceration rate of any nation. 234 Perhaps more
surprisingly, the United States has less than five percent of the world's
population, but prisoners in the United States account for an astonishing
one-quarter of the global prison population. 235 The United States
incarcerates more individuals-both in absolute terms and per capitaincluding
the
world,
nation
in
other
than
any
significantly-more-populated China, which rates second, and Russia,
which rates third.23 6 Either Americans are truly the least law-abiding
citizens in the world, or we should consider making changes to the

230. Who Pays the Legal Fees and Court Costs in a Lawsuit?, DOUGLAS HAUN HEIDEMANN
PC (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.dhhlawfirm.com/win-case-will-defendant-pay-attorney-fees.
231. See ERINN HERBERMAN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP'T JUST., STATE
GOVERNMENT INDIGENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES,

FY 2008-2012 - UPDATED

1-3 (2015),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgideO812.pdf.
232. Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, Mental Health and the Constitution: How
Incarcerating the Mentally Ill Might Pave the Way to Treatment, 20 NEV. L.J. 547, 563-64 (2020).
233. ACLU, OVERCROWDING AND OVERUSE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

(2015), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Overlncarceration/ACLU.pdf.
234. Id.; Brown, supra note 78; william N. Clark & Artem M. Joukov, The Criminalizationof
America, 76 ALA. LAW. 225 (2015); see also Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. Caspar, Wherefore
is Fortunato?How the Corpus Delicti Rule Excludes Reliable Confessions, Helps the Guilty Avoid
Responsibility, and Proves Inconsistent with Basic Evidence Principles,41 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 459,
481, 522 (2018) (noting the large number of state and federal statutes that may lead to prosecution
and discussing the possibility that confessions to crime may be easier to secure from a mentally ill
defendant even when that defendant did not commit the crime).
235.

Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, supra note 233.

236.

Id.
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system and restraining prosecutors from being so willing to incarcerate
their fellow citizens.
During the past forty years, the number of persons held in
American prisons and jails has more than quadrupled, and the total
number of individuals incarcerated in the United States is greater than
2.3 million. 237 Since 1970, the U.S. prison population has increased
700%, which is far greater than any increases in U.S. population and
crime rates.238 One in ninety-nine American adults now lives in a jail or
prison, and one in thirty-one U.S. adults is under correctional control,
which includes prison, jail, parole, and probation. 23 9 Stated differently,
approximately 2.3 million persons are in jails or prisons at any given
moment, and nearly 4.5 million more are on probation or parole. 240 One
24 1
in two American adults has had a family member in jail or prison.
Existing jail and prison facilities are extremely overcrowded, with
prisoners forced to sleep in gyms, hallways, or quadruple-bunked in
cells. 24 2
The extreme increase in jail and prison populations has
consequences that resonate far outside of jail or prison walls: one in four
Americans has a criminal record, which often imposes significant
obstacles to securing loans, obtaining housing, securing professional
24 3
licenses, and finding employment, as discussed in more detail below.
Across the United States, young Black men are disproportionately
incarcerated and under correctional control. 2 " More than seventy-five
percent of United States residents are White, and approximately thirteen
percent of United States residents are Black. 245 At the end of 2016,
however, Black inmates outnumbered White inmates by 487,000 to
440,000.246 Black men also receive federal prison sentences that are, on
average, nearly twenty percent longer than those of White men who
commit the same crime. 24 7 Some of this may be the responsibility of
judges, but there is no question that prosecutors play an important part in
the sentencing process by advocating for (usually) a stricter punishment
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Adachi & Calloway, supra note 105.
241. Id.
242.

Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, supra note 233.

243. Id.; Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. Caspar, Who Watches the Watchmen? Character
and Fitness Panels and the Onerous Demands Imposed on Bar Applicants, 50 N.M. L. REV. 383,

394 (2020).
244.

Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, supra note 233.

245. Brown, supra note 78.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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than suggested by the defense. In addition, when prosecutors offer a plea
deal, White defendants are twenty-five percent more likely than Black
defendants to have their most serious initial charge dropped or reduced
to a less severe charge. 248 The excessive use of incarceration and
correctional control--especially among poor persons and persons of
color-is often referred to as mass incarceration.24 9
Mass incarceration raises serious constitutional and human rights
concerns. The human rights violations inherent in the United States
system of mass incarceration reverberate on a number of fronts: from
racial disparities in arrests, convictions, and sentencing; to oppressive
and inhumane sentencing mandating non-violent offenders to serve
extreme sentences in prison; to increased impacts on vulnerable
populations including mentally ill individuals.25 0 Unsurprisingly, in
almost every one of these areas, a prosecutor's role can be essential to
preventing injustice. A prosecutor's role can also be essential for that
injustice to flourish.
B.

Wrongful Convictions

Wrongful convictions were once thought to be very rare, even
non-existent, in the United States criminal justice system.251 However,
the invention of DNA analysis in the late 1980s created the possibility of
post-conviction DNA testing, which often served to exonerate the person
convicted of a crime.25 2 Since 1989, 2,732 persons have been exonerated
following DNA analysis, confession by the actual offender, or by other
25 4
means. 2" Estimates of the full extent of wrongful convictions vary. A
2007 study of persons sentenced to death from 1973 to 2004 resulted in
a 2.3% exoneration rate.2 5 However, a later study in Virginia discovered
that the wrongful conviction rate was fifteen percent for persons
248.

Id.

249.

Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, supra note 233.

250.

Id.

251. An Epidemic of Prosecutor Misconduct, supra note 75; Overcrowding and Overuse of
Imprisonment in the United States, supra note 233.
252. An Epidemic of Prosecutor Misconduct, supra note 75.
253. National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/

special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). These exonerated individuals have
lost a combined 24,770 years of their lives due to wrongful convictions. Id.
254. KELLY WALSH ET AL., NAT'L CRIM. JUST. REF. SERV., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF
David
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/251115.pdf;
Horan, The Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Boardfor Wrongful Convictions, 20 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 91, 91 (2000).

255. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent 6 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
http://papers.ssm.com/
103, 2008),
Paper No.
Paper Series,
Working
Theory
sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1100011.
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convicted of sexual assault.25 6 Regardless of whether the actual
percentage is two or fifteen, it is clear that each year, thousands, or tens
of thousands, of innocent Americans are deemed to be criminals and sent
to jail or prison for offenses that they did not commit. 257 Some of these
individuals may be incarcerated for crimes that no one committed. The
exact extent of prosecutorial misconduct is unknown, but a ballpark
understanding of the issue comes from the National Registry of
Exonerations, which has concluded that an astonishing forty-three
percent of wrongful convictions are attributable to official prosecution
misconduct.25 8
The costs to incarcerate wrongfully convicted inmates can also be
substantial. In 2013, 160,800 prisoners nationwide who were convicted
of rape or other sexual assaults were under state jurisdiction. 259 If the
fifteen percent wrongful conviction rate from the Virginia study
described above was accurate nationwide, 24,120 inmates would have
been wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. 260 The average state
corrections expenditure per inmate is approximately $28,323, which
translates into an annual expenditure of more than $683,000,000 just to
house those wrongfully convicted of sexual assault alone. 2 6I However,
this number is an underestimate, as it fails to include defendants
wrongfully detained in local jails or in military or federal prisons, or
detained persons awaiting trial. 262
C.

A Lifetime of Hardships

When an individual is convicted-or even accused-of a crime, the
individual's criminal history becomes public record. 263 Running a
background check on the individual can reveal his or her entire criminal
history-from a small, marijuana-related misdemeanor to more serious

256.

JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URB. INST., POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL

CONVICTION 5-6 (2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412589-Post-Conviction-DNATesting-and-Wrongful-Conviction.pdf. The fifteen percent statistic likely underestimates the actual
extent of wrongful convictions, as even in many cases where a DNA match is present, the sexual
encounter may have been consensual and therefore non-criminal.
257. An Epidemic of ProsecutorMisconduct, supra note 75.
258. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UPDATE: 2012, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
EXONERATIONS
(2013),

NRE2012UPDATE4_1_13_FINAL.pdf.
259. An Epidemic of ProsecutorMisconduct, supra note 75.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 5 Ways a Criminal Record Hurts Your Future, LAW OFF. NED BARNETT (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.nedbarnett.com/5-disadvantages-criminal-record.
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felonies. 2 64 Because several organizations run background checksincluding potential employers, rental housing providers, and loan
providers-having any criminal record creates significant obstacles for
criminal offenders. 26
Three in four people found it difficult to find work after being
released from prison, and only forty percent of those surveyed were
working full-time after five years. 2 1 The inability to fmd work once a
person has a criminal record makes it difficult for individuals to pay
child support or to contribute to housing or food costs. 267 Individuals
with criminal records often have to find employers willing to take a
chance on them or accept work far below their education levels or
previous pay levels. 268 Additionally, those with criminal records may
fmd it difficult to become a lawyer, doctor, nurse, or other professional
that requires a professional license with a character and fitness
component. 69
Individuals with criminal records also find it difficult to further
their education, one of a handful of things that could improve their
financial situation. 270 Those with criminal records are often barred from
receiving grants or loans for schooling. 271 The inability to receive federal
student aid may not last indefinitely, but it can delay the individual's
72
education and make it less likely the individual will return to school. 2
Those with criminal records can also be denied public housing due
to their criminal history, and their families can be removed from public
housing if they have an individual living with them who has a criminal
record.2 73 These individuals can also be denied private housing. 274 Being
unable to find decent housing can make it difficult for the person to
maintain child custody or visitation, and it is not uncommon for
individuals with criminal records to experience homelessness. 275

264. Id.; The presence of convictions related to marijuana possession on background checks is
particularly cumbersome on a national level due to the prevalence of their use. See, e.g., Samantha
M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, The Implications of MarijuanaLegalization on the Prevalence and
Severity of Schizophrenia, 28 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 178 (2018).
265. 5 Ways a Criminal Record Hurts Your Future,supra note 263.
266. Alana Semuels, What Incarceration Costs American Families, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015),

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/the-true-costs-of-mass-incarceration/405412.
267. Id.
268.

5 Ways a Criminal Record Hurts Your Future,supra note 263.

269. Id.
270. Semuels, supra note 266.
271.

5 Ways a Criminal Record Hurts Your Future,supra note 263.

272. Id.
273. Semuels, supra note 266.
274.

5 Ways a Criminal Record Hurts Your Future,supra note 263.

275.

Id.
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A NEW ARGUMENT TO ABOLISH ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY

'

The United States Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman held that
absolute immunity for prosecutors was necessary due to public policy
considerations (among other considerations). 276 However, these
considerations have not withstood the test of time and are no longer
persuasive justifications for absolute prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler,
the Court suggested that abolishing absolute immunity would lead to a
floodgate of litigation against prosecutors, as "a defendant often will
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of
improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate." 277 This claim
ignores the possibility that other remedies exist for prosecutors faced
with wrongful lawsuits. 278 The Court apparently discounts in its analysis
the fact that courts have long had doctrines in place to prevent frivolous
lawsuits, which are subject to dismissal for a variety of reasons. 279
Additionally, in 1994, the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant must prevail in proving his or her conviction wrongful or his
or her trial unfair before the defendant can attempt to file a lawsuit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,280 which further limits the number of potential
lawsuits against prosecutors by eliminating claims arising from law
enforcement actions that were likely proper (as indicated by past
proceedings). 2 8
The United States Supreme Court also held that absolute immunity
was vital because other avenues for prosecutorial accountability exist.282
While other means of prosecutorial accountability do exist (such as the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct), this Article has already
demonstrated that these avenues are not sufficient to address
prosecutorial misconduct. 283 Study after study has shown professional
disciplinary organizations failing to hold prosecutors accountable, even
for the most blatant prosecutorial misconduct. 284
Another major reason for the implementation of absolute immunity
to prosecutors was the United States Supreme Court's belief that civil
suits would result in prosecutors incurring a financial burden and

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976).
Id. at 425.
Sarma, supra note 25.
Id.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Sarma, supra note 25.
Sarma, supra note 25.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-29.
See supra Part III.D.2.

284. An Epidemic of ProsecutorMisconduct, supra note 75; Sarma, supranote 25.
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possibly dismissing cases that should not otherwise be dismissed due to
fear of potential litigation. 285 These concerns should be moderated. If
prosecutors were found liable, it is likely that their employers-the
Government-would be the party bearing any financial burden. 286
Additionally, prosecutors could avoid dismissing a case that merits
prosecution, instead choosing to dismiss frivolous cases or cases where
the punishment may be disproportional to the crime-which is a benefit,
not a drawback. This may also lead to an increase in the number of
settlements between the Government and various defendants, reducing
risks to both parties by encouraging prosecutors to be more reasonable in
plea bargaining. 287 Moreover, prosecutors could ensure against the risk
of litigation from their misconduct in the same way as civil practitioners
and privately practicing defense lawyers: by purchasing malpractice
insurance.
Other public employees responsible for law enforcement, like
police officers, do not have absolute immunity and are held accountable
in court for egregious behavior.2 88 Updating the absolute immunity
doctrine does not require a constitutional change but simply requires the
United States Supreme Court to update its view on absolute immunity's
applicability. 289 If the United States is serious about decreasing mass
incarceration, or at least improving the criminal justice system's
fairness, it is vital to hold accountable those actors authorized to charge,
try, and convict individuals. This means that civil lawsuits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the common law tort of malicious prosecution
should permit recovery against unscrupulous prosecutors in some
instances.

285.

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426-27.

286.

Sarma, supra note 25.

287. Arguments can be made that more settlements replacing trials should not be the goal of
the criminal justice system. We do not engage these arguments here. Yet, if the United States
Supreme Court or other policymaking body considers plea bargains a positive force that increases
judicial efficiency, then eliminating absolute prosecutorial immunity could be one way to enhance
that efficiency.
288. Block, supra note 118.
289. Sarma, supra note 25. This would add clarity and consistency within the law, permitting
liability for prosecutors and eliminating a court-created provision of non-statutory law that treats
prosecuting attorneys differently from everyone else and might stun the ordinary citizen when
confronted by it. See generally Artem M. Joukov, Isn't That Hearsay Anyway? How the Federal
HearsayRule Can Serve as a Map to the Confrontation Clause, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 337, 380 (2018)

(emphasizing the importance of legal clarity); Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. Caspar, Comrades
or Foes: Did the Russians Break the Law or New Groundfor the First Amendment?, 39 PACE L.

REv. 43, 99 n.326 (2018) (emphasizing the same).
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Using the Equal Protection Clause to Remove Absolute
ProsecutorialImmunity

In evaluating whether a legal provision is constitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause and the equal protection principles implicit in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, courts
consider whether the distinction is based on a suspect classification, such
as race or gender. 290 In the absence of this classification, courts apply
rational basis review. 291 Since absolute prosecutorial immunity does not
appear to be imposed primarily on the basis of race and gender (at least
not on its face), it is likely that it would receive the least amount of
scrutiny under equal protection principles. 292 However, recent decisions
293
have shown that even rational basis scrutiny is not without bite.
Applying the more stringent rational basis review could (and should)
lead courts to reconsider their position on prosecutorial immunity just as
they did on the equal protection merits of a challenge to the prohibition
of same-sex marriage (both of which were first litigated around the same
time decades ago). 2 94
290. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746-48 (2007);
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-34
(1984); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74-77 (1971);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56
(1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(demonstrating that non-statutory government decisions about something as basic as awarding a
government contract are subject to equal protection scrutiny); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
291. United States v. Maryland Sav.-Share Ins., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970); United States v.
windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774-75 (2013); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (explaining the departure from the default rational basis standard in favor of heightened
scrutiny); williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23 (1985); Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
882-83 (1985); Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472
U.S. 159, 178 (1985); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; Artem M. Joukov, A Second Opinion: Can Windsor v. United States
Survive PresidentTrump's Supreme Court?, 27 J.L. & POL'Y 327, 352-59 (2019).
292. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S.
CONST. amend. V.

293. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768-70; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of
Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of
Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2769,
2770, 2774 (2005); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection in the Wake of Romer v. Evans:
Implicationsfor the Defense of MarriageAct and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 180 (1997);
see also Williams, 472 U.S. at 22-23. See generally Ward, 470 U.S. at 881-83.
294. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (finding no constitutional question in
a challenge to a state prohibition of same-sex marriage); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 774-75 (invalidating
on constitutional grounds a federal definition of marriage which excluded same-sex couples from
the institution); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (explicitly reversing Baker).
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The rational basis inquiry would reveal that an individual
maliciously prosecuted due to the actions of a lay witness or a law
enforcement officer suffers the same or similar harm if he or she is
maliciously prosecuted by a prosecutor. There is little difference
between facing prison (or in some cases, the death penalty) because a
witness is lying, a police officer is lying, or a prosecutor is lying. From
the perspective of the defendant, the harmful outcome is identical. What
rational basis, then, exists to prevent recovery by those wrongfully
accused and prosecuted by prosecutors compared to everyone else?
Certainly, the class of people wrongfully accused by prosecutors should
not be materially different than the class of people wrongfully accused
by everyone else.
Perhaps prosecutors are so different from other accusers that they
deserve extra protections? As we discussed, this was perhaps the
assumption behind applying absolute immunity to prosecutors in the first
place. As we demonstrated above, many of the reasons for treating
prosecutors differently do not apply either in logic or in practice.2 9
Hence, it should be challenging for this judicial rule to survive
constitutional scrutiny on those bases. Perhaps additional reasons for
maintaining prosecutorial immunity have emerged or will emerge in the
future. It is difficult to make such predictions, so it may be more
illustrative to show what a malicious prosecution claim looks like and
why applying such a claim to prosecutors (just like to other parties
involved) should neither break our legal system nor greatly interrupt
prosecutorial functions.
Consider the case of ColonialStores, Inc. v. Scarbrough,2 96 where a
gentleman successfully sued his accusers (a business employee and the
business itself) for falsely identifying him as the perpetrator of a
robbery. 297 In that case, Scarbrough found himself behind bars while
awaiting trial for a robbery he did not commit due to a false eyewitness
identification. 298 Despite his exoneration and release upon additional
investigation that led to a dismissal of the charges, Scarbrough suffered
reputational damages (as many falsely-accused individuals do, similar to
defamation damages), and experienced a deterioration of his
psychological health to the point of attempting suicide. 299 Even though
295.

See supra Part V.

296. 355 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977).
297. Id. at 1183. He did so through claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Id.
at 1183, 1186 (affirming a general verdict for respondent, sustaining the judgment upon the
sufficient evidence of the malicious prosecution claim, alone, and thus not finding it necessary to
decide the sufficiency of the alternative false imprisonment claim).
298. Id.
299. Id.
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his misidentification could have been an honest mistake, the law of the
State of Florida permitted him to sue his private party accusers and
recover damages. 300 Yet, if the misidentification or some other
impropriety within the case had come by way of prosecutorial action
(such as the prosecutor continuing to argue for the defendant's detention
in jail after learning Scarbrough had been misidentified), an individual in
Scarbrough's position could find no vehicle for recovery in the law
despite identical damages. This Article proposes to rectify this
discrepancy by simply allowing individuals like Scarbrough to add one
more party to his lawsuit: the prosecutor.
Some arguments might exist for why protections should extend to
the prosecutor rather than to Scarbrough's accusers. After all, a
prosecutor may be reluctant to bring criminal charges against anyone for
fear of revenge without at least some legal protections. Yet, the same
could have been true of citizens just like Scarbrough's accusers:
prosecuting them would reduce the plausibility of subsequent citizens
coming forward to report crime. 30' However, the Florida Supreme Court
specifically considered this possibility when asked to protect
Scarbrough's malicious prosecutors from liability, rejecting it as a sound
reason to deny the plaintiff recovery. 302
The same has been true of other state courts as well: the chilling
effect on reporting crime does not eliminate the tort of malicious
prosecution. 303 The tort even extends to legal authorities, such as police
officers, which combines with actions under the Civil Rights Act, such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.304 It is true that officers receive qualified immunity,
but as many case examples demonstrate, this immunity is far from
absolute. 305 Police officers have been held liable for illegal arrests and
prosecutions initiated against the innocent. 306 Courts have allowed this
despite the potentially chilling effects on police reporting crime. 307
Yet, lawyers working as state attorneys, district attorneys, or United
States attorneys (and sometimes working at offices of the state attorney

300. Id.
301. Id. at 1185.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-7-40 (2020) ("Right of action for malicious prosecution.");
ALA. CODE § 6-5-550 (2020) ("Cause of action for malicious prosecution of civil action against
health care provider.").

304. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Police Misconduct and Civil Rights, supra note 124.
305. QualifiedImmunity, supra note 63.
306. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986) (ruling that a police officer is liable
in a wrongful arrest); Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S Ct. 911, 919 (2017) (permitting a malicious
prosecution claim against a police officer).
307. Malley, 475 U.S. at 343.
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general) still escape this brand of lawsuit under the doctrine of absolute
immunity. 308 Without any statutory basis or legislative permission,
courts have recognized certain privileges that extend to members of the
judicial branch, such as judges, and advocates before the court, such as
prosecutors, while withholding these privileges from more "blue-collar"
workers. 309 Among these privileges is the apparent right to be above the
law: the right to commit even the most egregious acts of malicious
prosecution and still escape without civil liability. 31 0
An innocent person who finds herself in the crosshairs of an
overzealous criminal prosecution is inherently in a precarious position,
regardless of whether a police officer or an overzealous prosecutor
caused the problem: through no fault of her own, she finds herself
pursued by the powers of the state criminal justice system. Being
innocent, she has done nothing to incur the wrath of the police or of the
witnesses against her that would justify the prosecution. Yet, despite the
harm to her reputation and the physical and emotional stress of being
accused and potentially imprisoned in anticipation of trial, the law limits
her recovery against some parties more than against others. 311 So, if she
finds herself in the class of people prosecuted due to malicious
prosecution, she has the full right to sue her accusers, granted they are
the individuals who pressed charges against her, without fear of judicial
bars.3 12 If she finds herself in the class of people prosecuted due to false
police testimony, the bar becomes higher: she must establish that the
police acted in contravention of well-established law in testifying against
her. 3 13 If she finds herself in the class of people harmed by a prosecutor
who brought a case the prosecutor knew had no evidentiary basis, she
has no legal recourse at all. 314
This discrepancy raises the obvious question: Why would a
criminal defendant in one circumstance have greater limitations on her
rights to recover for the harm done to her than all the others? How does
this discrepancy provide her with equal protection of the laws permitting
civil recovery for damages, and if there is some rational basis for
treating her differently when she is the victim of a prosecutor's actions,
308. Chemerinsky, supra note 34, at 477; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011).
309. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-31
(1976).
310. Connick, 563 U.S. at 54, 71-72.
311. Basic Guide to Immunity for Government Officials, HELBRAUN L. FIRM,
https://www.helbraunlaw.com/basic-guide-to-immunity-for-government-officials (last visited Feb.
8, 2021).
312. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181, 1183, 1185 (Fla. 1977).
313. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
314. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
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does that rational basis survive decisions like United States v. Windsor 315
and the heightened rational basis scrutiny that case imposes? Another
important question is why do prosecutors receive greater protections
than police? A police officer must often make swift decisions about who

to arrest and subject to prosecution. 31 6 These decisions may be rendered
under heavy duress, with the officer's life or health in danger, which
might affect decisions about how to make the arrest in the first place.3 17
These decisions may also be made in instances where civilian lives are at
stake. 3 18 Yet, incorrect decisions can still subject the officer to civil
suit.31 9 If the action contravenes one of many "clearly" established laws
or constitutional provisions (and their legal interpretation by any number
of courts) that lawyers expect officers to remember, the officer and his
department may be subject to lawsuit and may be liable for millions of
dollars in damages. 320 However, a lawyer, having the opportunity to
consider and reflect on a criminal case without any physical or mental
duress, can make a decision that also contravenes clearly established law
and suffer no civil liability whatsoever.321
This is a remarkable set of rules. The legal system in its current
state would absolve the lawyer of responsibility, while refusing to do so
for the police officer, in instances where the harder decision clearly lies
in the officer's hands. The duress of a rapid decision to make an arrest
that leads to prosecution in a life-or-death situation is not the only
consideration that should lead to undo this distinction.32 2 Given that law
enforcement officers and prosecutors both make legal evaluations in
reaching their final decisions,"23 why is the prosecutor held to no
standard of accountability while the police officer must face the
possibility of a lawsuit? Most prosecutors have attended law school and
passed the bar examination. 32 4 Arguably, this additional level of

315. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
316. Matthijs J. Verhulst & Anne-Franeoise Rutkowski, Decision-Making in the Police Work
Force:Affordances Explainedin Practice, 27 GRP. DECISION & NEGOT. 827, 832 (2018).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319.

Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Weighs Qualifed Immunity for Police Accused of

Misconduct, NPR (June 8, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/08/870165744/supremecourt-weighs-qualified-immunity-for-police-accused-of-misconduct.
320. Qualified Immunity, supra note 63; Police Misconduct and Civil Rights, supra note 124.
321. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430-31 (1976).
322. Verhulst & Rutkowski, supra note 316, at 832.
323. See, e.g., Lance Eldridge, Understanding the Officer-Prosecutor Divide, POLICE1 (Oct.
15, 2010), https://www.policeone.com/legal/articles/understanding-the-officer-prosecutor-divideNKLsp5aiNjBDLCyr.
324. How

to

Become

a

Prosecutor,

CRIM.

JUST.

PROGRAMS,

https://www.criminaljusticeprograms.com/specialty/prosecutor (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
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expertise should place them in a better position to make accurate
decisions than law enforcement officers who often lack the same
rigorous legal training.325
Even if some law enforcement officers gain additional knowledge
as a result of long tenure with the police department (perhaps even
exceeding the criminal law knowledge of young prosecutors),
less experienced prosecutors often have the ability to consult more
experienced members of their office for help or conduct intense legal
research prior to reaching a decision to prosecute. 326 This option may be
unavailable to a law enforcement officer who must make a split-second
decision between life and death.327 So what can justify this distinction of
opening a police officer to a large amount of civil liability while
shielding a prosecutor entirely? If anything, it is the lawyers that should
face additional legal scrutiny for pursuing malicious or unconstitutional
prosecutions rather than law enforcement personnel. The additional
training lawyers receive should make their mistakes all the more
inexcusable. 32 8 If the elements of the charge can be established against a
prosecutor, why should the victim of the malicious or unconstitutional
prosecution fail to recover? In addition, with several protests recently
rocking the United States, many American citizens support stripping
police officers of their qualified immunity altogether, and there are
currently eight qualified immunity cases now pending before the United
States Supreme Court.329 If the United States Supreme Court banishes
qualified immunity for police officers, despite their inherently dangerous
jobs, why should prosecutors, who risk far less and do not experience
life-or-death decisions the way that police officers do, receive absolute
immunity while police might receive no immunity at all?
The current policy of absolving criminal prosecutors from liability
for malicious prosecution also makes little sense when comparing the
harms the accused actually suffers. 330 If falsely accused by a lay witness
in civil court, then at least the unpleasant experience ends without any
criminal charges. The defendant successfully defends himself or herself

325.

Christine Gardiner, How Educated

Should Police Be?,

NAT'L POLICE FOUND.,

https://www.policefoundation.org/study-examines-higher-education-in-policing
2021).
326.

(last visited Feb. 8,

HENRY F. FRADELLA & DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM 165-66 (12th ed. 2017).
327. Verhulst & Rutkowski, supra note 316, at 832.
328.

How to Become a Prosecutor, supra note 324.

329.

Totenberg, supra note 319.

330.

Serious Long-Term

Consequences Often Come with Arrest Records,

GROSHEK L.,

https://www.christagrosheklaw.com/Articles/Serious-long-term-consequences-often-come-witharrest-records.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

360

[Vol. 49:315

from false allegations, potentially recovers his or her legal fees (plus
other damages in the event of a malicious prosecution civil claim), and
continues on with his or her life.331 The same is true if a law enforcement
officer gives false testimony to implicate the defendant in a civil
context. 332 False statements that lead to criminal prosecution may be
more troubling, given that a conviction could potentially lead to criminal
liability, a criminal record, and a preclusive effect in subsequent civil
litigation that might arise.33 3 Yet, thankfully for the falsely accused,
recovery against lying police officers is at least cognizable under the
law, and recovery against lying lay witnesses is even easier. 3 4 However,
once a prosecutor becomes involved, the impact of the case on the
defendant rises exponentially.33 5
The moment a prosecutor puts pen to paper, initiating the
prosecution of the accused, he or she certifies, in a highly official
capacity, that probable cause has been found that the defendant
committed a crime. 336 If the crime is a felony, the risks for the defendant
increase significantly, and even if ultimately acquitted, the defendant
may be forced to disclose that he or she has been so charged on job
applications, applications to join a professional body (such as the legal
bar of a particular state), and in other matters.3 7 This effect is now
beginning to apply to misdemeanors as well, with employers sometimes
requiring applicants to disclose any formal charges whatsoever. 33 8
Perhaps even more concerning, the criminal charge becomes a part of
the publicly-accessible court record, backed by the authority and
impressive credentials of the prosecutor bringing the charge.3 3 9 This

331. Puja Sachdev, Four Things to Remember if You're Being Falsely Accused in Court,
SACHDEV LEGAL GRP. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.sachdevfamilylaw.com/blog/four-things-to-

remember-if-youre-being-falsely-accused-in-court.
332. See id.
333. Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60
WASH. L. REV. 805, 830 (1985).
334. Qualified Immunity, supranote 63.
335. Off. of the U.S. Att'ys, Charging, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice101/charging (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
336. U.S. Att'y Off. Dist. of Minn., Criminal Procedures, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (May 1, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/criminal-procedures.
337.

What Long-Term Consequences Could a Criminal Conviction Have on My Life?, supra

note 227.
338. J.E. Cornett, Necessity of Disclosing a Misdemeanor for Employment, CHRON,
https://work.chron.com/can-still-job-got-arrested-but-not-convicted-21382.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2021).
339.

Expungement

and

Record

Sealing,

JUSTIA,

https://www.justia.com/criminal/

expungement-record-sealing (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
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consequence can be far more damaging to a defendant's life and career
340
than mere false testimony by a police officer in a civil case.
Even an acquittal would not indicate a triumph for the person
accused, since overcoming criminal charges might not imply innocence,
but merely a lack of admitted evidence demonstrating guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 34 ' Hence, rumors of alleged misconduct will always
inevitably hover over the accused, regardless of how innocent he or she
might have really been. 342 Therefore, refusing to permit an individual so
harmed to recover for the harm she suffers simply because she was
harmed by a prosecutor rather than a law enforcement agent makes little
sense from an equal protection perspective. 343 By limiting the rights of
the wrongly accused to fight back, the judicial rule puts such individuals
in a disadvantageous position and emboldens wrongful prosecution by
members of a state or federal prosecuting office.
Another approach to the disparate treatment afforded to police
officers and prosecutors is from the perspective of the police officer
under Equal Protection Clause scrutiny. 344 The officer might argue that
he did not receive equal protection of the law compared to the prosecutor
despite similar circumstances.34 5 After all, if prosecutors receive
absolute immunity despite their legal training and the extensive time
they have to make a decision, then so should law enforcement
officers. 3" The rational basis for the distinction might be present in
some instances: maybe the creation of the judicial rule properly accounts
for a greater number of cases that might be brought against the average
prosecutor than the average police officer. 347 After all, statistics in some
areas may suggest that the prosecutor would encounter far more
defendants in his or her practice than the average police officer, resulting
in a far greater number of potential plaintiffs. 348 On the other hand, it
seems like a grim legal outcome that a civil defendant's potential to
harm far more people than other defendants would absolve him of
responsibility rather than exposing him thereto. Nevertheless, a facial
340.

Id.

The Burden of Proof in Criminal and Civil Cases, LAW OFF. VIKAS BAJAJ (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.bajajdefense.com/the-burden-of-proof-in-criminal-and-civil-cases.
341.

342.

Expungement and Record Sealing, supra note 339.

343. See, e.g., Sarma, supra note 25.
344. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430-31 (1976).
345. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
346.

Equal Protection, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (June 18, 2004), https://www.britannica.com/

topic/equal-protection.
347. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (2011).
348. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

362

[Vol. 49:315

challenge to the rule would surely run into at least some examples of a
potential need for prosecutorial absolute immunity that cannot be
universally declared as failing to rise to the level of rational basis. 34 9
A facial challenge to the judicial construction may fail, but a
challenge as-applied might be quite successful. 5 0 This would be
particularly true in instances where extenuating circumstances may truly
suggest that the officer should receive the benefit of the doubt where a
barred lawyer should not. For example, if a law enforcement officer
discharges her firearm in a highly dangerous situation requiring a
lightning-fast decision, and subsequently finds herself sued for
unconstitutional use of force, she may be able to argue that prosecutors
receive absolute immunity in instances where no swift decision needs to
be made, and, therefore, she should receive similar immunity given the
circumstances of her case. Because she is in a similar crime-fighting role
to the attorneys, and facing far greater danger, perhaps the protections
extended to lawyers should also be extended to her as a matter of equal
protection."' Why should she receive any less legal protection for
pulling the trigger in an instance where she felt confident that her life
and the lives of other citizens were in danger, compared to a lawyer who
falsely charged someone with a crime from the comfort and safety of his
office? To the extent that the officer's role is different than that of the
prosecutor, it seems that the prosecutor's role is far less demanding of
fast, life-or-death decisions and hence should receive fewer protections
from civil liability, not more.3 2 Therefore, the dissimilarity should strike
in favor of protecting the officer more than the prosecutor, not the other

way around.
More importantly, though, such a challenge to a distinction between
judicial rules should receive particular attention in light of a bigger
question: Whether qualified immunity and absolute immunity should be
assigned on the basis of class. Perhaps the most important objection to
treating lawyers and members of law enforcement differently is the

349. Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facialand As-Applied Challenges, 18 wM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 657, 657 (2010).
350. Id.
351.

Equal Protection, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

equal-protection (last visited Feb. 8, 2021); see also Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov,
Worse than Punishment:How the Involuntary Commitment of Persons with Mental Illness Violates

the UnitedStates Constitution, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 499, 525-26 (2020).
352. Michael B. Sauter & Charles Stockdale, The Most Dangerous Jobs in the US Include
Electricians, Firefighters and Police Officers, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2019, 12:53 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/01/08/most-dangerous-jobs-us-where-fatal-injurieshappen-most-often/38832907.
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difference in their socioeconomic circumstances.3 5 3 This is a crucial
question, because an examination of the socioeconomic circumstances of
the average police officer and the average lawyer reveal differences in
family wealth,35 4 education,355 prestige, 56 race and ethnicity,357
gender,35 and a host of other characteristics that may underscore a
sinister intent behind granting absolute immunity to the lawyer and only
qualified immunity to the police officer.3 59
The average police officer may come from a family in which
parents have received a lower level of education compared to a lawyer's
family (perhaps leading to reduced access to legal education for the
officer himself), and law enforcement officers are less likely than
lawyers to come from wealthier families. 360 The average law
enforcement officer has received less legal education than the average
lawyer.3 61 Most lawyers, as a matter of requirement in most states, hold a
JD as well as an undergraduate degree of some kind. 362 Some may even
hold additional graduate degrees, such as an LLM, a PhD, or a JSD.
Some law enforcement officers do hold a JD, but this is the exception,
not the rule, and far from a requirement to be a law enforcement

353. The average salary for a police officer is approximately $54,000. Average Police Officer
https://www.payscale.com/research/US/
2021),
31,
(Jan.
PAYSCALE
Salary,
Job=PoliceOfficer/Salary. The median salary of a lawyer was $122,960 in 2019. How Much Does
a Lawyer Make?, U.S. NEWS, https://money.usnews.com/careers/best-jobs/lawyer/salary (last
visited Feb. 8, 2021).
354.

Susanna Rustin, Household Income Plays Crucial Role in Determining a Child's

Prospects - Report, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/
2017/jul/12/household-income-crucial-role-children-life-prospects-Ise-report.
355.

How to Become a Prosecutor,supra note 324; Gardiner, supranote 325.

Johnny Wood, These Are the World's Most Respected Professions, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/these-are-the-world-s-most-respected15,
2019),
professions.
357. 65.5% of police officers are White, whereas 85% of lawyers are White. Police Officers,
DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/police-officers (last visited Feb. 8, 2021); Debra Cassens
Weiss, Lawyer Population 15% Higher than 10 Years Ago, New ABA DataShows, A.B.A. J. (May
3, 2018, 2:31 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyerpopulation_15_higher_
than_10_yearsagonewabadatashows.
358. 12.8% of full-time law enforcement officers in the United States are female whereas more
than one in three lawyers are women. Erin Duffin, Gender Distribution of Full-Time Law
356.

Enforcement

Employees

in

the

United

States

in

2019,

STATISTA

(Oct.

1,

2020),

https://www.statista.com/statistics/195324/gender-distribution-of-full-time-law-enforcementemployees-in-the-us; Jennifer Cheeseman Day, Number of Women Lawyers at Record High but
8,
2018),
(May
BUREAU
U.S.
CENSUS
Earners,
Highest
Men
Still
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/05/women-lawyers.html.
359. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
424-27 (1976).
360. Rustin, supra note 354.
361. How to Become a Prosecutor,supra note 324; Gardiner, supranote 325.
362. How to Become a Prosecutor,supranote 324.
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officer.3 63 Many police departments and sheriff's departments do not
require a degree beyond a high school diploma (or its equivalent) to
become a law enforcement officer. 364
Police do receive training at police academies, though much of this
is physical training to fulfill the requirements of the job rather than the
type of legal training a lawyer receives in law school, which might help
him or her understand when he or she is on the verge of engaging in
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct.3 65 This is not to say that
police are not trained in the law-they certainly are. 366 Law enforcement
officers must often make the initial determination of probable cause to
arrest an individual when they observe the commission of a crime and in
367
situations where there may be no opportunity to obtain a warrant.
There is no question that such a determination requires applying the
criminal code and the U.S. Constitution to observed (or otherwise
ascertained) facts. This determination does require serious training,
which applies even in a circumstance where police officers have the time
to apply for a warrant, since a proper affidavit of probable cause must be
submitted with such an application by the law enforcement officer. 368
However, we doubt that any amount of training can adequately prepare a
law enforcement officer to make perfect, split-second decisions
regarding arrest and detention. Yet, unlike a lawyer, law enforcement
officers can theoretically be held liable for being wrong about the tasks
369
they perform in the field of duty, regardless of its hazardous nature.
This apparently illogical distinction between law enforcement
officers and prosecutors appears to be based highly on class. Law
enforcement officers are generally considered "grey-collar" workers, a
term used to describe individuals classified somewhere between
blue-collar and white-collar workers. 370 Prosecutors, though, are
white-collar workers. 371 Some prosecutors ultimately become judges

&

363. Gardiner, supra note 325.
364. Id.
365. Rosa Brooks, Stop Training Police Like They're Joining the Military, ATLANTIC (June 10,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/police-academies-paramilitary/612859.
366. Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS
CLARK L. REV. 789, 795-97 (2013).
367. Id.
368.

Sara J. Berman, Arrest Warrants: What's in Them, How Police Get Them, NOLO,

(last
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arrest-warrants-how-when-police-get-them.html
visited Feb. 8, 2021).
369. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
427-30 (1976).
370. Hassan Choughari, Types of Collar Workers! (Updated), LINKEDIN (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/whats-types-collar-workers-hassan-choughari.
371. Rob Berger, The Difference Between White Collar and Blue Collar, DOUGHROLLER (Dec.
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through the use of the political connections they gain during their
prosecutorial service to the state or federal government. 372 And,
ironically, it is judges that craft these judicial exemptions from liability
for prosecutors that practice before them and likely share their social
circles.3 73 It is judges who find far more in common with lawyers than
law enforcement officers, that exempt the former from liability while
imposing the prospect of liability on the latter.3 74 While it may be that
law enforcement officers can attend law school, earn a law degree, pass
the bar, and then also become a judge, this is the exception rather than
the rule.37
As it is, the protections judges offer prosecuting attorneys are
superior to those available for law enforcement despite the fact that a
prosecuting lawyer generally has more legal knowledge with which to
defend himself or herself in the event of a lawsuit, 376 earns more, 377 has
greater access to legal representation as a result of those earnings, 378 and
would be far more likely to recover financially given an unfavorable
verdict. 379 The fact that the law currently gives the advantage to
prosecutors seems untenable in this light. It almost appears as if lawyers
seized control of the entire court system and unilaterally gave
themselves a free pass. This distinction hardly upholds the impartiality
that judicial bodies are supposed to maintain and hardly avoids the
appearance of impropriety that judges are supposed to avoid. 38 0
What is more, we should consider the class comparison between a
malicious prosecutor and the unjustly prosecuted. Here, there may also
5, 2019), https://www.doughroller.net/personal-finance/the-difference-between-white-collar-andblue-collar.
372. Opinion, Too Many Prosecutors Become Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1986, at A26.
373.

Fredric N. Tulsky, Part Four: How Judges Favor the Prosecution, MERCURY NEWS (Jan.

31, 2007, 10:36 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2007/01/31/part-four-how-judges-favor-theprosecution.
374.

Clark Neily, Are a Disproportionate Number of Federal Judges Former Government

18, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/studies/areCATO INST. (Sept.
Advocates?,
disproportionate-number-federal-judges-former-government-advocates.
375. Gardiner, supra note 325.
376.

Id.; How to Become a Prosecutor, supra note 324.

377. The national average annual wage of a police officer is approximately $54,000. Average
Police Officer Salary, supra note 353. The average annual salary of a prosecutor is approximately
$66,000. Average Prosecutor Salary, PAYSCALE (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.payscale.coml
research/US/Job=Prosecutor/Salary.
378.

Sarah Lustbader, Wealthy and Connected Defendants Like Roger Stone Get off Easy All

the Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2020, 10:47 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/
Arpit Gupta & Ethan
02/14/wealthy-connected-defendants-like-roger-stone-get-off-easy-all-time;
Frenchman, The US Bail System Punishes the Poor and Rewards the Rich, QUARTZ (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://qz.com/900777/the-us-bail-system-punishes-the-poor-and-rewards-the-rich.
379. Lustbader, supra note 378; Gupta & Frenchman, supra note 378.
380. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010).
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be a significant socioeconomic gap that manifests itself in differences in
upbringing, 381 family wealth,3 82 education, 383 race and ethnicity, 384 and
many other factors. Given that a disproportionate amount of individuals
who find themselves in the crosshairs of the legal system are of minority
descent, 385 the racial and ethnic differences between the prosecutor and
the prosecuted are non-trivial. 386 With this practical reality in mind, the
law currently allows the predominantly White, educated, and wealthy to
attack others with impunity. 387 Given that a false criminal accusation is a
significant attack due to the costs associated with a criminal conviction,
or even the threat of one, the idea that the falsely accused have no
recourse against their prosecutors has the flavor of class warfare. 388
There is not much that equal protection principles can do to correct
the socioeconomic imbalance between the malicious prosecutor and the
prosecuted: the Equal Protection Clause obviously cannot render a
defense or civil cause of action just because the prosecutor differs from
the plaintiff. However, equal protection principles may provide the
necessary foundation for a citizen to challenge the bar on his or her civil
recovery simply because he or she fell victim to malicious prosecution
perpetrated by a prosecutor rather than a police officer or lay witness.
Curiously, an Equal Protection Clause challenge might also be raised by
a law enforcement officer, citing the unjust unavailability of the absolute
immunity defense for the officer's actions while the same defense is
available to a prosecutor. This challenge may be unlikely to succeed if
raised by the police officer, given recent cases indicating the need to
hold law enforcement accountable. 389 If anything, such a challenge
381. KEVIN N. WRIGHT & KAREN E. WRIGHT, FAMILY LIFE AND DELINQUENCY AND CRIME: A
POLICYMAKERS' GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE i-ii (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/

Digitization/140517NCJRS.pdf
382. Id.
383. Crime Rates Linked to Educational Attainment, 2013 Alliance Report Finds, ALL. FOR
EXCELLENT EDUC. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://all4ed.org/press/crime-rates-linked-to-educationalattainment-new-alliance-report-finds.
384. Timothy williams, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate than Whites. What if
Prosecutors

Didn't

Know

Their

Race?,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

12,

2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html.
385. Id.
386. See Weiss, supra note 357.
387. Lustbader, supra note 378; Gupta & Frenchman, supra note 378.
388. Breanne Pleggenkuhle, The Financial Cost of a Criminal Conviction: Context and
Consequences, 45 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 121, 130-32 (2018).
389. Recently, on May 25, 2020, police responded to a call regarding a man who allegedly
used a counterfeit $20 bill to buy cigarettes. Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in
Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floydinvestigation.html. Seventeen minutes later, the man-George Floyd-was dead, after former police
officer Derek Chauvin murdered him by pinning Floyd down, with his knee to Floyd's neck, for
over eight minutes, resulting in Floyd's inability to breathe. Id.
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might underscore the need to eliminate absolute immunity for
prosecutors rather than raising law enforcement to an equal degree of

legal infallibility.
While the comparison between the treatment of malicious
prosecution victims of law enforcement and prosecutors seems to have
the starkest difference in the context of judicially granted immunities,
we should not forget that another comparison may be relevant: the
treatment of a misbehaving prosecutor compared to a civil practitioner
engaged in plaintiff's work. For those finding law enforcement
investigative functions and prosecutorial judicial functions too distinct
for a proper equal protection comparison, this should help allay at least
some of the opposition to our argument. After all, plaintiff's lawyers
engage in work quite similar to the work of the prosecutors, yet they
390
suffer significantly greater reprimand for doing so callously.
First, plaintiff's lawyers may find themselves on the hook for their
opponent's attorney's fees and costs if their conduct in a civil or
administrative proceeding was in bad faith or carried out for an improper
purpose.3 9 ' The conduct can include filing a lawsuit or administrative
action that the plaintiffs lawyer knew or should have known would not
succeed. Other remedies available to the wrongfully sued are quite
expansive. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serves as a
good, though rarely used, example. Filing frivolous claims can result in
penalties imposed by the very court where the claims are filed within
that very case. 392 Notably, the wronged party need not even initiate a
393
separate proceeding to recover for some of the damages incurred.
Furthermore, it may even be possible to hold a plaintiff's lawyer,
rather than just the plaintiff, responsible for a malicious prosecution
claim." 4 It is certainly not inconceivable that lawyers, not just their
clients, may have personal animosity against a civil defendant and
therefore may launch a legal action they know cannot succeed with the
intent of pestering or embarrassing the defendant.395 In such a situation,

390.

Legal

Malpractice

Law

-

Plaintiffs,

U.S.

NEWS

&

WORLD

REP.,

(last visited Feb. 8,
https://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/legal-malpractice-law-plaintiffs/overview
2021).
391. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.595 (2019); id. § 120.569(2)(e), (k)(2); id. § 57.111; id.
§ 57.105; Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So.2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998).
392. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. An interesting Article exists suggesting that something similar to the
Federal Rule 11 should be adopted for prosecutors. Yuri R. Linetsky, A Rule 11for Prosecutors,87
TENN. L. REv. 1, 57-62 (2019).

393.

FED. R. Ci. P. 11.

394.

John H. Beers, Note, Attorney's Liability to Client's Adversariesfor InstitutingFrivolous

Lawsuits: A Reassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 775, 796-80 (1979).
395. Id. at 776.
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we are aware of no immunity (not even qualified immunity) that would
protect the plaintiff's lawyer from lawsuit. Yet, courts nevertheless
extend absolute immunity to the prosecutor. 396 The availability of this
remedy also does not negate the professional sanctions a plaintiff's
lawyer might suffer as a result of legal misconduct for violating bar
rules. 397 This allows civil lawyers to be held responsible both ethically
and civilly, while prosecutors need only fear ethical actions. 398
There is an important difference between lawyers in civil practice
and prosecutors and law enforcement officers that some may cite to
justify the distinction: civil practitioners are generally unelected private
individuals while prosecutors and sheriffs are generally elected (and
police chiefs are ordinarily appointed by an elected mayor of a
municipality). 399 Arguably, then, if a prosecutor or his deputies act
inappropriately and bring wrongful prosecutions against members of the
community, those members can find justice at the ballot box (one might
advance a similar argument about the sheriff and the police chief).4 00
Therefore, one might argue that the immunities extending to prosecutors
(and law enforcement officers) are properly applied since their acts are
partially political and should have a political rather than a civil remedy.
Hence, similar to absolute immunities from lawsuits set aside for
legislators and executives acting in their political capacity, the average
prosecutor should receive protections. 40 1
The problem with this conclusion is that the amount of exposure to
political correction prosecutors face is apparently insufficient to curb
some of the bad habits they exhibit.4 0 2 Many prosecutors run for
re-election every six years, which can be a remarkably long time for an
unscrupulous elected prosecutor with equally unscrupulous deputies to
engage in malicious prosecution.4 03 Even at the end of the six years,
396. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-31 (1976).
397. See, e.g., SARAH DIANE MCSHEA, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REP., GUARD AGAINST CRIMINAL,
CIVIL
&
DISCIPLINARY
LIABILITY:
A
PRACTICAL
GUIDE
(1998),
http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/guard-against-criminal-civil-disciplinary-liability-a-practicalguide.
398. Id.; Briggs v. Goodwin, supra note 11, at 378; Niles, supra note 20, at 147-48; Johns,
supra note 20, at 516-17; McClelland, supra note 36, at 1329-31.
399. FAQ, NAT'L SHERIFFS' ASS'N, https://www.sheriffs.org/about-nsa/faq (last visited Feb. 8,
2021).
400. Id.
401. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748-49 (1982) (extending absolute immunity to the
President); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1998) (extending absolute immunity to
legislators).
402. How Common Is ProsecutorialMisconduct?, supra note 104.
403. See THE PROSECUTORS & POL. PROJECT, NATIONAL STUDY PROSECUTOR ELECTIONS 9,

11, 117, 125 (2020), https://law.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/National-Study-ProsecutorElections-2020.pdf.
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many prosecutors face no opposition at the ballot box, seemingly
guaranteeing re-election regardless of the misconduct during their terms
in office.4 04 Even if they did face opposition, individuals who they have
prosecuted, however unjustly, may lack recourse at the ballot box
because being convicted of certain crimes often relieves the convict of
the right to vote.40 5 Federal prosecutors serve essentially at the pleasure
of the President of the United States, which allows even less monitoring
by voters and almost guarantees long tenures. 406 Some might argue that
the large caseload of prosecutors entitles them to greater protections than
civil practitioners. 407 While some prosecutors may be busier than their
civil practice counterparts, which may lead to more errors suggesting the
need for immunity, this is not uniformly the case. 40 8
Yet, as with all equal protection analyses, this one cannot be
complete without a balancing test.409 The Equal Protection Clause would
not come into play on account of gender or race in this setting. 41 0 It is
true that malicious prosecution might disproportionately affect
minorities and males, since they are most often prosecuted on average,
but it seems unlikely that malicious prosecution occurs with sufficient
disproportion to justify a race-based or sex-based challenge. 411 To do so,
a plaintiff would have to establish that absolute prosecutorial immunity
so pervasively deprives males or Black people of their right to recovery
for damages (compared to other genders or sexes), that it constitutes de
facto discrimination. 42 We are not certain that the evidence of this is
quite strong enough. However, it is always possible for individuals
whose rights to recovery have been judicially curtailed to argue that their
404.

See Rory Fleming, Why So Many Prosecutors Enjoy Uncontested Re-Election, FILTER

(Jan. 21, 2020), https://filtermag.org/prosecutors-uncontested-elections.
405.

Felon

Voting

Rights,

NAT'L

CONF.

STATE

LEGIS.

(Jan.

8,

2021),

https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx.
While it is true
that those actually convicted cannot bring a malicious prosecution claim (perhaps the prosecution
was not malicious if it yielded a conviction), it is possible for individuals to be properly prosecuted
for some crimes and then improperly prosecuted for others. In fact, experiences with the justice
system that lead to convictions can "inspire" prosecutors to view certain defendants as a target in

the future, regardless of the impropriety of bringing cases against them. It would not be uncommon
for a prosecutor wavering between charging criminal conduct and filing a nolle prosequi to look at
the defendant's record and let that serve as a tiebreaker on probable cause decisions.

406. See 28 U.S.C. § 541.
407. Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 347, at 267-70.
408. See id. at 283-85, 288-92.
409. See Equal Protection of the Laws, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.comell.edu/
constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/equal-protection-of-the-laws (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
410. Id.
411. NAT'L ACADS. SCIS., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION: RACE,
ETHNICITY,
AND
GENDER:
PROCEEDINGS
OF A
WORKSHOP
IN
BRIEF,
(2018),
https://www.nap.edu/read/25247/chapter/1.
412. Equal Protectionof the Laws, supra note 409.
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differential treatment compared to other similarly-situated plaintiffs has
no rational basis in law.4 13 Then, courts would have to consider the
rational basis for allowing prosecutors to escape civil liability no matter
how egregious their conduct. 414 This requires us to address in additional
detail the reasoning behind the courts granting absolute immunity to
prosecutors.
The reasoning behind absolute prosecutorial immunity might
include the need to protect prosecutors from endless lawsuits by
415
hundreds of potential litigants that prosecutors face on a yearly basis.
Additionally, it may be that permitting lawsuits for mistaken
prosecutions would have a chilling effect on prosecutions. 416 In either
situation, courts may be seeking to reduce not only the burden on
prosecutors and their respective offices but also the burden additional
lawsuits would place on the court system as a whole. 417 The trouble with
these reasons is that they can apply almost equally to law enforcement
officers, yet those harmed by law enforcement officers have a path to
recovery while those harmed by prosecutors have none.
For example, reducing lawsuits against police officers would
undoubtedly lower the strain on the court system. 418 However, in a
society intent upon justice, it seems strange and grotesque to limit who
may recover simply to avoid burdening the court system. If the limiting
principle does not permit the elimination of lawsuits against law
enforcement personnel working in an investigative capacity, 419 why
should it limit recovery for prosecutors executing their judicial duties? It
appears rather hypocritical of the legal profession to hold that the harms
caused by any other professionals are subject to suit while the harms
caused by prosecuting attorneys remain without redress. 42 0 Perhaps
errors made by judges do not leave sufficient legal avenues for redress,
since there you would ask the judiciary to police itself with respect to
civil liability, a move that undoubtedly creates a long list of interest
conflicts.4 1 However, when a civil lawsuit concerns prosecutors, who
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 347, at 278-79.
416. ProsecutorialImmunity, supra note 36.
417. Id.
418. Herbert Brownell, Jr., The Problem of Backlogs: A NationalShortcoming in Our Courts,
42 A.B.A. J. 1032, 1032-33.
419. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982).
420. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-31 (1976); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
229-30 (1988).
421. Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Judges PolicingJudges: True DisciplinaryActions Are
Rare (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 26, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/judges-policing-judges-true-disciplinary-actions-are-rare.
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are members of the executive branch of the state and federal
government, such conflicts disappear. In fact, if prosecutors can be held
in civil and criminal contempt by members of the judiciary for acting
disrespectfully or dishonestly toward the court or its officers,42 2 why
limit their liability to innocent victims harmed by the same or similar
conduct? The current state of the law makes it appear that judges
recognize prosecutorial misconduct and refuse to permit it in their
courtroom. Yet, when the prosecutorial misconduct impacts someone
else, they have continuously shielded the prosecutors responsible from a
civil lawsuit.
B.

Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?

Of course, the changes we and our fellow scholars propose may
have externalities. The reason for opening prosecutors up to liability is to
allow recovery to victims of their misconduct and to eliminate the
apparent distinction on the basis of class between prosecutors, law
enforcement, and common citizens that act maliciously to bring the
innocent before a court. Primarily, we argue for this change on equal
protection principles because the judicial rules allowing prosecutors to
escape liability appear to limit recovery for some victims but not others
without a rational basis.423 However, in allowing actions to proceed
against prosecutors, we might create, or rather exacerbate, another class
distinction: that between rich and poor defendants.
The literature on how the impoverished favor in court compared to
their wealthier counterparts can be summarized quickly-not well. 4 24
Unsurprisingly, wealth can buy many advantages, including access to
bail,42 ' better counsel, 4 2 6 placement on probation rather than being sent
to prison,427 the ability to file for sealing or expungement of the case, 428
422. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
423. EqualProtectionof the Laws, supranote 409.
424. You're Better Off 'Rich and Guilty than Poor and Innocent,' Panel Told, CRIME REP.
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/03/08/youre-better-off-rich-and-guilty-than-poorand-innocent-panel-told.
425. Id.
426. Chloe Della Costa, In America, Only Rich People Get a Fair Trial, SHOWBIZ CHEAT
SHEET (June 2, 2015), https://www.cheatsheet.com/money-career/in-america-only-the-rich-get-a-

fair-trial.html.
427. Equal Justicefor the Poor, Too; Far Too Often, Money-or the Lack of It-Can Be the
Deciding Factor in the Courtroom, Says Justice Goldberg, Who Calls for a Program to Insure

Justice for All Americans, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 15, 1964, at SM24 https://www.nytimes.com/
1964/03/15/archives/equal-justice-for-the-poor-too-far-too-often-moneyor-the-lack-of.html
[hereinafter Equal Justicefor the Poor].
428. Kenny Lo, Expunging and Sealing Criminal Records, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 23,

2020),
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and the possibility of influence or bribery with the judge or threatening
(implicitly or explicitly) to contribute to the campaign of an opposing
judge at the next election, among other potential benefits. 429 Some of
these potential benefits are legal and likely happen much more often
than the rest, but it is difficult to believe that illegal methods are never
employed to gain the upper hand in a criminal trial.430 Hence, it is not
difficult to see why the wealthy have a much better chance of escaping
both conviction and punishment in court. 431
Yet the one weapon that the wealthy do not yet have is the actual
ability to sue the prosecutor who brings charges against them. 4 2 This
power might be too great indeed. Even a prosecutor acting in good faith
might become intimidated by the concept of being sued and losing
significant amounts of money on the chance the criminal jury and the
subsequent civil jury side with the plaintiff. We might suspect that if a
prosecutor truly acts in good faith, a plaintiff's lawyer contacted by a
defendant without great means (but with an axe to grind) would refuse to
take the case on a contingency basis because the attorney might believe
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the case would be unlikely to succeed. 33 However, the stakes change
when the defendant is a millionaire who would be able to pay the lawyer
by the hour just to pester the prosecutor. Then, the threat of what is
essentially counter-prosecution becomes quite real. This would make the
prosecution of wealthy criminals more expensive and burdensome for
prosecutors, which, in turn, would reduce prosecution in that area and
focus it on the impoverished.
Of course, a prosecutor maliciously prosecuted in civil court for
bringing a valid case in good faith may herself have a civil remedy
against the criminal defendant under the same tort: malicious
prosecution.434 Given sufficiently committed parties, we could
theoretically envision an infinite spiral of litigation arising from two
435
parties suing each other perpetually for malicious prosecution.
Prosecutor prosecutes Defendant criminally, and Defendant prevails.
Defendant then sues Prosecutor civilly for malicious prosecution, and
Prosecutor prevails. Prosecutor then sues Defendant civilly for malicious
prosecution for Defendant's malicious prosecution lawsuit. Defendant
prevails and returns to court to sue Prosecutor again, this time for the
malicious civil prosecution of the Defendant. The cycle could continue
perpetually, but of course, this is true in cases not involving prosecutors
as well. Moreover, the plausibility of malicious prosecution ad infinitum
can always be reduced by the prosecutor simply not filing his or her own
lawsuit for recovery after succeeding in the initial malicious prosecution
trial.
Furthermore, the threat of civil retaliation by the wealthy does not
loom so large when considering that, prior to bringing a malicious
prosecution action against the prosecutor, the wealthy criminal
defendant must first prevail in his or her criminal case. Given that the
prosecutor is supposed to act in good faith in bringing the criminal
43 6
charges to begin with, the odds of this outcome should be low.
Overall, preventing the average innocent person accused of a crime from
recovery simply because the wealthy may exploit the system would not
conform to general legal principles.
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The wealthy have an advantage in many areas of life.4 37 Those who
are wealthy generally receive better medical care, 43 8 live longer, 439 have
access to healthier foods,4 0 live in less crime-ridden neighborhoods
(which may receive less attention from the police and lower the odds of
apprehension),"' may get favors from the police in criminal
investigations," 2 may not be charged at the same rate as individuals
living in impoverished neighborhoods," 3 and are generally more
successful in navigating the legal system,44 due in part to access to
better counsel (and perhaps due to the fact that attorneys are often
members of the wealthy class themselves).4 5 The fact that the wealthy
may receive advantages within the legal system due to the availability of
certain legal remedies seems like a poor justification to deprive everyone
else of those remedies. This justification would only further
disadvantage those who are less wealthy within our courts by depriving
them of the little protection that the availability of a malicious
prosecution claim can provide them. Since it is primarily the less
wealthy that are in court, we should not fear to extend to them the right
to sue an unscrupulous prosecutor just because a small subset of criminal
defendants may be wealthy enough to abuse the right.
Furthermore, it would be inconsistent to withdraw rights from all
Americans to prevent the wealthy from exploiting those rights. After all,
in the most basic instance of affording the right to counsel in criminal
proceedings, there is almost no question that a privately retained lawyer
(or lawyers) would provide a superior defense.'0 Private counsel has
certainly been the revealed preference of criminal defendants that could
afford one.4 7 However, we do not deprive all citizens of the right to
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8
counsel simply because some may afford better counsel than others."
Rather, we appoint counsel for the indigent even though we recognize
such counsel may have less time to tend to their case than a privately
hired attorney." 9 We endeavor to provide the rights to everyone, even
pro se litigants, and then permit free exercise of that right even if the
wealth of individuals impacts the extent to which the right can be
exercised. The economic reality that wealthy individuals can exercise
their rights more readily should not prevent the extension of those rights
to everyone.

VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has surveyed the problems with granting prosecutors
absolute immunity from suit and has discussed the potential equal
protection implications of this judicial rule. This Article demonstrates
that if a statute promulgated by a state or federal legislature took the
position advocated by the judiciary, it would almost certainly face a
challenge under the federal Equal Protection Clause."' The same would
be true of an order issued by the state or federal executive branch, and in
the case of the states, the attempt to limit prosecutor liability absolutely
could face a challenge under the state constitution as well (since state
constitutions often contain a due process clause and at least an
45 1
aspirational statement about equal protection).
The fact that what we challenge is a judicially created rule does not
mean it cannot unjustly deprive citizens of legal protections from
malicious prosecution. In light of the United States Supreme Court's
more stringent requirements of rational basis review that were adopted in
United States v. Windsor, we do not see this judicial standard surviving
much longer given the dissipation of the public image of the average
prosecutor.452 Although in the past prosecutors were viewed as those
who "wear the white hats," the actions of many of them, now coming
45 3
into the public light, prove this image false in many circumstances.
Prosecutors are, by all accounts, just as human as anyone else.
Permitting them to practice without any liability for their actions does
not make for good policy and invites mis'conduct.
What we propose is a small change in the law that sets prosecutors
on a more equal footing with others who practice similar roles: changing
448.
449.
450.

See id.
See id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

451.
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absolute prosecutorial immunity into qualified prosecutorial immunity.
Based on their similarity to other lawyers and law enforcement
personnel, it seems entirely proper that prosecutors should receive
qualified rather than absolute immunity. Granting prosecutors a more
limited range of protections while still imposing a higher standard that
the plaintiff must satisfy will strike a better balance between limiting
frivolous suits against prosecutors by angered defendants and permitting
those who were truly harmed by a prosecutor's misconduct to recover
for the damages they suffered.
We should not expect prosecutors to simply fall in line without any
true impediment to their actions: the evidence shows they have failed to
do so until now, and there is no apparent change on the horizon. 5 4
Instead, we should provide the parties particularly motivated by the
misconduct of prosecutors the right to pursue their case against the
individual that may have destroyed a life, a career, and/or a person's
reputation. The motivation to find the truth and hold a bad prosecutor
responsible that manifests within the victim of malicious prosecution
will prove a far greater check on misuse of prosecutorial power than
anything state bars and other enforcement agencies have been able to do.
More importantly, it will allow the individual actually harmed by the
prosecutor to recover for their harm, something bar sanctions and other
enforcement of legal norms cannot achieve.
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